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  1. Understanding conditional promises and threats.Sieghard Beller, Andrea Bender & Gregory Kuhnmünch - 2005 - Thinking and Reasoning 11 (3):209-238.
    Conditional promises and threats are speech acts that are used to manipulate other people's behaviour. Studies on human reasoning typically use propositional logic to analyse what people infer from such inducements. While this approach is sufficient to uncover conceptual features of inducements, it fails to explain them. To overcome this limitation, we propose a multilevel analysis integrating motivational, linguistic, deontic, behavioural, and emotional aspects. Commonalities and differences between conditional promises and threats on various levels were examined in two experiments. The (...)
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  • The Causal Structure of Utility Conditionals.Jean-François Bonnefon & Steven A. Sloman - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (1):193-209.
    The psychology of reasoning is increasingly considering agents' values and preferences, achieving greater integration with judgment and decision making, social cognition, and moral reasoning. Some of this research investigates utility conditionals, ‘‘if p then q’’ statements where the realization of p or q or both is valued by some agents. Various approaches to utility conditionals share the assumption that reasoners make inferences from utility conditionals based on the comparison between the utility of p and the expected utility of q. This (...)
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  • The psychology of reasoning about preferences and unconsequential decisions.Jean-François Bonnefon, Vittorio Girotto & Paolo Legrenzi - 2012 - Synthese 185 (S1):27-41.
    People can reason about the preferences of other agents, and predict their behavior based on these preferences. Surprisingly, the psychology of reasoning has long neglected this fact, and focused instead on disinterested inferences, of which preferences are neither an input nor an output. This exclusive focus is untenable, though, as there is mounting evidence that reasoners take into account the preferences of others, at the expense of logic when logic and preferences point to different conclusions. This article summarizes the most (...)
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  • Reasoning and argumentation: Towards an integrated psychology of argumentation.Jos Hornikx & Ulrike Hahn - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):225 - 243.
    Although argumentation plays an essential role in our lives, there is no integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation. Instead research on argumentation is conducted in a number of separate research communities that are spread across disciplines and have only limited interaction. With a view to bridging these different strands, we first distinguish between three meanings of the word ?argument?: argument as a reason, argument as a structured sequence of reasons and claims, and argument as a social exchange. (...)
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  • Utility conditionals as consequential arguments: A random sampling experiment.Jean-François Bonnefon - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):379 - 393.
    Research on reasoning about consequential arguments has been an active but piecemeal enterprise. Previous research considered in depth some subclasses ofconsequential arguments, but further understanding of consequential arguments requires that we address their greater variety, avoiding the risk of over-generalisation from specific examples. Ideally we ought to be able to systematically generate the set of consequential arguments, and then engage in random sampling of stimuli within that set. The current article aims at making steps in that direction, using the theory (...)
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  • The specificity of terms affects conditional reasoning.Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda & Markus Knauff - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (1):72-93.
    Conditional inferences can be phrased with unspecific terms (“If a person is on a diet, then the person loses weight. A person is on a diet. The person loses weight”) or specific terms (“If Anna is on a diet, then Anna loses weight. Anna is on a diet. Anna loses weight”). We investigate whether the specificity of terms affects people's acceptance of inferences. In Experiment 1, inferences with specific terms received higher acceptance ratings than inferences with unspecific terms. In Experiments (...)
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  • When can we say ‘if’?Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Helen Neilens, Simon J. Handley & David E. Over - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):100-116.
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