In Book 3 of the Tusculans, Cicero reports that the Cyrenaics practised the premeditation of future evils. This article focuses on the philosophical consistency of this exercise with other Cyrenaic testimonies. It argues for the authenticity of Cicero’s report and provides a critical survey of previous attempts to reconstruct the theory underlying Cyrenaic premeditation, which addresses crucial questions about the management of future pleasures and pains, and the duration of affections. New evidence from Diogenes Laertius 2.94 is then used to (...) support an alternative interpretation of the Cyrenaic praemeditatio malorum. (shrink)

Special volume of "Thaumàzein - Rivista di Filosofia" dedicated to the theme of Socratic Eudaimonia and care for others. It is a multilingual volume comprising twenty papers divided into six sections with an introduction by Linda Napolitano. Edited by Santiago Chame, Donald Morrison, and Linda Napolitano. -/- Despite the appearances given by certain texts, the moral psychology of Socrates needs not imply selfishness. On the contrary, a close look at passages in Plato and Xenophon (see Plato, Meno 77-78; Protagoras 358; (...) Gorgias 466-468; Euthydemus 278; Lysis 219; Xenophon, Memorabilia III 9, 4-5) suggests that the “egoist”’s welfare depends upon the welfare of others (i.e. family, friends or the whole city). Since the welfare of his family, friends and city is part of his own eudaimonìa, the “egoist” (phìlautos) has a direct and intrinsic motive to promote the welfare of these others. -/- This multilingual issue explores the role that other peoples’ welfare plays in Socratic ethics. Special attention is paid to test-cases in which the principle that moral action is always good only for the agent seems to have no validity. I.e., under which circumstances is the self-sacrifice for the sake of others (such as the soldier’s self-sacrifice on the battlefield) good for the agent (as in Alcibiades I 115a-116d)? Essays deal with contradictions or tensions of this sort, and relate them to more general views on eudaimonìa held within Socratic literature. Comparison between different Socratic authors is used as a means to identify the distinctive features of Socratic eudaimonìa if compared to other Greek theories of happiness, such as the Aristotelian theory of philautìa (NE IX, 1166a-1166b; 1168a-1169b). (shrink)

Este estudio pretende analizar la cuestión del conocimiento como el punto de partida del desarrollo filosófico cirenaico y no como un medio empleado para justificar el hedonismo de la escuela, separándolo de aproximaciones tradicionales a dicha problemática. Los filósofos cirenaicos asumen la percepción como la fuente del conocimiento humano, particularmente en lo que respecta a la afección. Conciben el páthos dentro de unos parámetros fisicalistas que vienen marcados por el movimiento que recae sobre el cuerpo-carne del sujeto perceptor. Estas afecciones (...) son lo único que, según los cirenaicos, se muestra con evidencia al sujeto humano. Las características que estos pensadores adscriben a la noción de páthos les obligan como sujetos de acción y posible conocimiento a prestar, prácticamente, exclusiva atención al presentismo de la percepción, adquiriendo, así, la afección cierta categoría de criterio. (shrink)

Unlike mainstream Cyrenaics, the Annicereans deny that friendship is chosen only because of its usefulness. Instead, the wise person cares for her friend and endures pains for him because of her goodwill and love. Nonetheless, the Annicereans maintain that your own pleasure is the telos and that a friend’s happiness isn’t intrinsically choiceworthy. Their position appears internally inconsistent or to attribute doublethink to the wise person. But we can avoid these problems. We have good textual grounds to attribute to the (...) Annicereans a doctrine of “non-hedonic habits,” which allows them to abandon psychological hedonism while still maintaining hedonism regarding well-being. (shrink)

I reject the traditional picture of philosophical withdrawal in the Hellenistic Age by showing how both Epicureans and Stoics oppose, in different ways, the Platonic and Aristotelian assumption that contemplative activity is the greatest good for a human being. Chrysippus the Stoic agrees with Plato and Aristotle that the greatest good for a human being is virtuous activity, but he denies that contemplation exercises virtue. Epicurus more thoroughly rejects the assumption that the greatest good for a human being is virtuous (...) activity. He maintains that the greatest good for a human being is the tranquility that virtuous activity always and contemplative activity sometimes brings about. (shrink)

Anarchism and Political Modernity looks at the place of 'classical anarchism' in the postmodern political discourse, claiming that anarchism presents a vision of political postmodernity. The book seeks to foster a better understanding of why and how anarchism is growing in the present. To do so, it first looks at its origins and history, offering a different view from the two traditions that characterize modern political theory: socialism and liberalism. Such an examination leads to a better understanding of how anarchism (...) connects with newer political trends and why it is a powerful force in contemporary social and political movements. This new volume in the Contemporary Anarchist Studies series offers a novel philosophical engagement with anarchism and contests a number of positions established in postanarchist theory. Its new approach makes a valuable contribution to an established debate about anarchism and political theory. It offers a new perspective on the emerging area of anarchist studies that will be of interest to students and theorists in political theory and anarchist studies. (shrink)

This thesis comprises a study of the ethical thought of Iris Murdoch with special emphasis, as evidenced by the title, on how morality is intimately connected to self-improvement aiming at perfection and how the study of fiction has an important role to play in our strive towards bettering ourselves within the framework set by Murdoch’s moral philosophy.

In this thesis, I explore Aristotle’s conception of the relation between practical wisdom and the end of action. Intellectualists claim that phronesis determines the end of action, whereas non-intellectualists claim that virtue as a non-rational state determines the end of action. Recently, Jessica Moss has provided a sustained defense of the non-intellectualist interpretation. I offer three arguments against Moss’s interpretation: the line at 1144a6-7 that is taken to provide an obvious support for the non-intellectualist interpretation does not provide an obvious (...) support. The non-intellectualist interpretation is inconsistent with the conclusion of Aristotle’s function argument. The non-intellectualist interpretation fails to distinguish between two distinct senses of ‘goal.’ After arguing against the non-intellectualist interpretation, I explore the relation between phronesis and eudaimonia. (shrink)

This article focuses on two very different thinkers from different periods of time, an early hedonist who belonged to Socrates’ circle and lived until the middle of the fourth century BCE and the late Stoic who ruled the Roman Empire in the second century CE. Despite all substantial divergences – for instance, on the value of pleasure – Aristippus the Elder and Marcus Aurelius shared an interest in presentism, broadly construed as a focus on the present and its primacy, and (...) engaged themselves in exercises regarding the experience of the present. Moreover, in developing their respective positions and the exercises they prescribed, we shall uncover and foreground their essentially therapeutic character. (shrink)

Argues that many of Zilioli's main contentions are mistaken--in particular, his contention that the Cyrenaics' skepticism is based upon an ambitious metaphysical thesis of indeterminacy.

Ancient Greek philosophical schools are said to share a common structure in their ethical theories which is characterized by a eudaimonistic teleology based in an understanding of human nature. At first glance, the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus as described in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism seems to fit into this model insofar as he describes the end of the skeptic as ataraxia, a common account of the expression of human happiness. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of Sextus’s philosophy for (...) several reasons. “The end of skepticism” cannot be eudaimonistic or teleological in the way that other ancient ethical theories are typically understood; moreover, ataraxia is not an end derived from a theory about human nature. For these reasons, the skeptical way of life is radically different than the ethical theories proposed by other schools. I argue that this difference is a result of the character of the skeptical enterprise which involves the implicit rejection of norms in both the epistemological and the ethical spheres. (shrink)

Prioritizing friendship is associated with many health and well-being benefits. However, to date, there have been relatively few studies that have examined cultural moderators of the link between friendship and important outcomes. In other words, is prioritizing friendships more beneficial in some contexts than others? In the current study, we examined how culture- and country-level factors were associated with the importance people place on friendships and the benefits derived from this importance. The sample comprised of 323,200 participants from 99 countries (...) from the World Values Survey. Multilevel analyses revealed that women, people with higher levels of education, and people living in countries that are more economically equal and high in indulgence placed more value on friendships. Prioritizing friendships in life was associated with better health and well-being, but these associations depended on many cultural factors. The findings are discussed in the context of the ways in which friendships can enrich health and well-being across different settings. (shrink)

Cet article s’attache à comprendre si les cyrénaïques étaient susceptibles d’être attaqués moyennant l’objection d’inactivité et, si oui, comment ils auraient pu essayer d’y répondre et quel type de vision morale ils auraient pu essayer de défendre. En traitant de ces questions, j’évaluerai la légitimité de l’interprétation du scepticisme cyrénaïque offerte par Jules Vuillemin. Je confirmerai ainsi la plausibilité de son interprétation et développerai en même temps l’exploration de la nature et de la portée de la philosophie cyrénaïque.