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  1. Rumfitt on the logic of set theory.Øystein Linnebo - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):826-841.
    ABSTRACTAccording to a famous argument by Dummett, the concept of set is indefinitely extensible, and the logic appropriate for reasoning about the instances of any such concept is intuitionistic, not classical. But Dummett's argument is widely regarded as obscure. This note explains how the final chapter of Rumfitt's important new book advances our understanding of Dummett's argument, but it also points out some problems and unanswered questions. Finally, Rumfitt's reconstruction of Dummett's argument is contrasted with my own preferred alternative.
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  • Dummett on Indefinite Extensibility.Øystein Linnebo - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):196-220.
    Dummett’s notion of indefinite extensibility is influential but obscure. The notion figures centrally in an alternative Dummettian argument for intuitionistic logic and anti-realism, distinct from his more famous, meaning-theoretic arguments to the same effect. Drawing on ideas from Dummett, a precise analysis of indefinite extensibility is proposed. This analysis is used to reconstruct the poorly understood alternative argument. The plausibility of the resulting argument is assessed.
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  • Generality, Extensibility, and Paradox.J. P. Studd - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (1):81-101.
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  • Numbers and Everything.Gonçalo Santos - 2013 - Philosophia Mathematica 21 (3):297-308.
    I begin by drawing a parallel between the intuitionistic understanding of quantification over all natural numbers and the generality relativist understanding of quantification over absolutely everything. I then argue that adoption of an intuitionistic reading of relativism not only provides an immediate reply to the absolutist's charge of incoherence but it also throws a new light on the debates surrounding absolute generality.
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  • Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo‐Logicism.Fraser MacBride - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):103-163.
    According to the species of neo-logicism advanced by Hale and Wright, mathematical knowledge is essentially logical knowledge. Their view is found to be best understood as a set of related though independent theses: (1) neo-fregeanism-a general conception of the relation between language and reality; (2) the method of abstraction-a particular method for introducing concepts into language; (3) the scope of logic-second-order logic is logic. The criticisms of Boolos, Dummett, Field and Quine (amongst others) of these theses are explicated and assessed. (...)
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  • Should the logic of set theory be intuitionistic?Alexander Paseau - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):369–378.
    It is commonly assumed that classical logic is the embodiment of a realist ontology. In “Sets and Semantics”, however, Jonathan Lear challenged this assumption in the particular case of set theory, arguing that even if one is a set-theoretic Platonist, due attention to a special feature of set theory leads to the conclusion that the correct logic for it is intuitionistic. The feature of set theory Lear appeals to is the open-endedness of the concept of set. This article advances reasons (...)
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  • Is Hume's principle analytic?Crispin Wright - 1999 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):307-333.
    This paper is a reply to George Boolos's three papers (Boolos (1987a, 1987b, 1990a)) concerned with the status of Hume's Principle. Five independent worries of Boolos concerning the status of Hume's Principle as an analytic truth are identified and discussed. Firstly, the ontogical concern about the commitments of Hume's Principle. Secondly, whether Hume's Principle is in fact consistent and whether the commitment to the universal number by adopting Hume's Principle might be problematic. Also the so-called `surplus content' worry is discussed, (...)
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