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The Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity

Eric T. Olson

In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and modality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 242 (2006)

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The ‘Is’ in Animal-is-m.Tristan Tondino - 2011 - Ithaque 9:107-129.details Eric T. Olson argues for a position in personal identity called Animalism. Olson's definition of ‘what we are’ is what the biological community currently defines as the ‘human animal’. While Olson argues his definition is determinate and anti-relativist, I object by maintaining that his definition is fundamentally soft relativist. This is accomplished by asking : 1) why favour the biological definition over other cultural definitions? – and by arguing : 2) that nothing stops the biological definition from changing ; 3) (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.details Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 35 citations
Unrestricted animalism and the too many candidates problem.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.details Standard animalists are committed to a stringent form of restricted composition, thereby denying the existence of brains, hands, and other proper parts of an organism . One reason for positing this near-nihilistic ontology comes from various challenges to animalism such as the Thinking Parts Argument, the Unity Argument, and the Argument from the Problem of the Many. In this paper, I show that these putatively distinct arguments are all instances of a more general problem, which I call the ‘Too Many (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 21 citations
Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem.Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.details : A key consideration in favour of animalism—the thesis that persons like you and me are identical to the animals we walk around with—is that it avoids a too many thinkers problem that arises for non-animalist positions. The problem is that it seems that any person-constituting animal would itself be able to think, but if wherever there is a thinking person there is a thinking animal distinct from it then there are at least two thinkers wherever there is a thinking (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations

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