The subject of this paper are the implications of Lyotard's critique of the intellectual as a public actor. It is shown that Lyotard's critique of politics results in a rejection of political theory, real politics and political involvement of the intellectual. In place of that, Lyotard develops his concept of "philosophical politics", i.e. "reflexive writing" as a specific form of political disengagement. The author argues that Lyotard's critique of the political involvement of the intellectual is acceptable, but that Lyotard's concept (...) of "philosophical politics" cannot compensate for the lack of an acceptable real politics and an appropriate political theory. It can be viewed only as an individual-existential posture of resistance to the dominant political patterns which, as preconditions of its own possibility, must presuppose the existence of an acceptable real politics and appropriate political doctrine. Osnovni predmet ovog rada predstavljaju implikacije Liotarove kritike intelektualca kao politickog delatnika. Autor najpre pokazuje da Liotarova kritika politike rezultira odbacivanjem politicke teorije, realne politike i politickog angazmana intelektualca. Umesto toga, Liotar razvija koncept "filozofske politike", tj. "refleksivnog pisanja", kao specifican oblik politickog dezangazmana. Za autora je Liotarova kritika politickog angazmana intelektualca prihvatljiva, ali naglasava da Liotarov koncept "filozofske politike "ne moze nadoknaditi nedostatak prihvatljive realne politike i odgovarajuce politicke teorije. Naime, ona moze da se shvati samo kao jedan individualno-egzistencijalni stav otpora prema vladajucim politickim obrascima, koji mora da pretpostavi postojanje prihvatljive realne politike i odgovarajuce politicke doktrine kao uslov sopstvene mogucnosti. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss cases in which moral grievances, particularly assertions that a moral injury has taken place, are systematically obstructed by received linguistic and epistemic practices. I suggest a social epistemological model for theorizing such cases of moral epistemic injustice. Towards this end, I offer a reconstruction of Lyotard’s concept of the differend, comparing it with Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, and considering it in light of some criticisms posed by Axel Honneth. Through this reconstruction and a (...) series of examples, I demonstrate that a basic formal structure recurs in cases of discursively repressed moral injury, namely, a particular kind of dilemma. I argue that appreciating this dilemma pushes us in the direction of a form of non-ideal ethical theory and I conclude by elaborating a conception of moral reflective judgement that begins from particular experiences of moral injury and moves towards the creation of new moral universals. (shrink)