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The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value

Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia

Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1207-1221 (2020)

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Circular Definitions of ‘Good’ and the Good of Circular Definitions.Andrés G. Garcia - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-14.details I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular counterpart and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1845-1860.details The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts, then value facts cannot be identical with or reduced to fittingness facts. One reply to this objection is to claim that the constitutive properties of attitudes also explain value facts, for they are enablers for the value possessed by an object. In this paper we argue that the enabling maneuver exposes FA to a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
A forgotten distinction in value theory.Facundo Rodriguez - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (10).details The debate on final value has been so far understood as a debate over what sort of properties final value depends on. The debate’s reliance on mere dependence has, I argue, made it very difficult for conditionalists to put forward a coherent positive alternative to intrinsicalism. Talk of dependence is too coarse-grained and fails to distinguish between different ways in which value can metaphysically depend on other properties of the value bearer. To remedy this, I propose that we bring back (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Value relations sans evaluative grounds.Andrés G. Garcia - 2023 - Ratio 36 (2):137-146.details I argue that there can be value relations without individual values to support them. The fact that an item is better than another item does not have to be explained by reference to the values of the individual items. Instead, value relations can be grounded directly and exhaustively in descriptive facts about their relata. I show that my suggestion fits well with plausible perspectives on the nature of values and reasons, respectively. One of them is the fitting‐attitudes view, according to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Explaining value: on Orsi and Garcia’s explanatory objection to the fitting-attitude analysis.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies.details Orsi and Garcia argue that fitting-attitude analysis of value is vulnerable to an explanatory objection. On FA-analysis, for an object to be valuable is for it to be a fitting target of an attitude—a pro-attitude if its value is positive and a con-attitude if it is negative. For different kinds of value different kinds of attitudes are fitting: desire for desirability, admiration for admirability, etc. To explain the fittingness relation we therefor need to appeal to the features of the relevant (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations

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