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Defending Millian Theories.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):703-728.details
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Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks.Bryan Frances - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.details
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Narrow content: Fodor's folly.Fred Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.details
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Externalism and Internalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - Oxford Bibliographies.details
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Wide Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1997 - Noûs 31 (s11):251-281.details
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Belief states and narrow content.Curtis Brown - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.details
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Real Knowledge. The problem of content in neural epistemics.J. J. M. Sleutels - unknowndetails
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Staving off catastrophe: A critical notice of Jerry Fodor's psychosemantics.Todd Jones - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (1):58-82.details
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Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience.Joseph Owens - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):242-61.details
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Environment-Dependent Content and the Virtues of Causal Explanation.Paul Noordhof - 2006 - Synthese 149 (3):551-575.details
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Content, causation, and cognitive science.David Braun - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):375-89.details
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Semantic Comprehension, Inference and Psychological Externalism.Joseph I. Owens - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):173-203.details
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Psychophysical supervenience: Its epistemological foundation.Joseph Owens - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):89-117.details
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