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Switch to: References
Citations of:
A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs
Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152 (2002)
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Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely (...) |
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We provide a critical assessment of the ambiguity aversion literature, which we characterize in terms of the view that Ellsberg choices are rational responses to ambiguity, to be explained by relaxing Savage's Sure-Thing principle and adding an ambiguity-aversion postulate. First, admitting Ellsberg choices as rational leads to behaviour, such as sensitivity to irrelevant sunk cost, or aversion to information, which most economists would consider absurd or irrational. Second, we argue that the mathematical objects referred to as “beliefs” in the ambiguity (...) |
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We consider a setting where a decision maker’s uncertainty is represented by a set of probability measures, rather than a single measure. Measure-by-measure updating of such a set of measures upon acquiring new information is well known to suffer from problems. To deal with these problems, we propose using weighted sets of probabilities: a representation where each measure is associated with a weight, which denotes its significance. We describe a natural approach to updating in such a situation and a natural (...) |
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The Condorcet Jury Theorem formalises the “wisdom of crowds”: binary decisions made by majority vote are asymptotically correct as the number of voters tends to infinity. This classical result assumes like-minded, expected utility maximising voters who all share a common prior belief about the right decision. Ellis : 865–895, 2016) shows that when voters have ambiguous prior beliefs—a set of priors—and follow maxmin expected utility, such wisdom requires that voters’ beliefs satisfy a “disjoint posteriors” condition: different private signals lead to (...) |
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This paper introduces a receiver who perceives ambiguity in a binary model of Bayesian persuasion. The sender has a well-defined prior, while the receiver considers an interval of priors and maximizes a convex combination of worst and best expected payoffs. We characterize the sender’s optimal signal and find that the receiver’s payoff differences across states given each action, play a fundamental role in the characterization and the comparative statics. If the sender’s preferred action is the least sensitive one, then the (...) |
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Maximum-likelihood updating is a well-known approach for extending static ambiguity sensitive preferences to dynamic set-ups. This paper develops an example in which MLU induces an ambiguity averse maxmin expected utility decision-maker to prefer a bet on an ambiguous over a risky urn and be more willing to bet on the ambiguous urn compared to an subjective expected utility decision-maker. This is challenging, since prior to observing draws from the urns, the MEU decision-maker actually preferred the risky over the ambiguous bet (...) |
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We examine collective decision-making in a jury voting game under the unanimity rule when voters have ambiguous beliefs. Unlike in existing studies (Ellis in Theoretical Economics 11:865–895, 2016; Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics Working Paper, 2021; Ryan in Theory and Decision 90:543–577, 2021), the locus of ambiguity is the likelihood function (signal precision) rather than the prior. This significantly alters the properties of symmetric equilibria. While prior ambiguity may induce multiple equilibria (Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics Working Paper, (...) |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 3, Page 620-638, November 2021. |
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We study the Full Bayesian Updating rule for convex capacities. Following a route suggested by Jaffray (IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 22(5):1144–1152, 1992), we define some properties one may want to impose on the updating process, and identify the classes of (convex and strictly positive) capacities that satisfy these properties for the Full Bayesian Updating rule. This allows us to characterize two parametric families of convex capacities: ${(\varepsilon,\delta)}$ -contaminations (which were introduced, in a slightly different form, by Huber (...) |
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On average, “young” people underestimate whereas “old” people overestimate their chances to survive into the future. Such subjective survival beliefs violate the rational expectations paradigm and are also not in line with models of rational Bayesian learning. In order to explain these empirical patterns in a parsimonious manner, we assume that self-reported beliefs express likelihood insensitivity and can, therefore, be modeled as non-additive beliefs. In a next step we introduce a closed form model of Bayesian learning for non-additive beliefs which (...) |
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