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  1. Are the preference axioms really rational?Paul Anand - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (2):189-214.
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  • A challenge to the compound lottery axiom: A two-stage normative structure and comparison to other theories.Donald B. Davis - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (3):267-309.
    This paper examines preferences among uncertain prospects when the decision maker is uneasy about his assignment of subjective probabilities. It proposes a two-stage lottery framework for the analysis of such prospects, where the first stage represents an assessment of the vagueness (ambiguity) in defining the problem's randomness and the second stage represents an assessment of the problem for each hypothesized randomness condition. Standard axioms of rationality are prescribed for each stage, including weak ordering, continuity, and strong independence. The ‘Reduction of (...)
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  • The Logics of Preference: A Study of Prohairetic Logics in Twentieth Century Philosophy.N. J. Moutafakis - 1987 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    With characteristic incisiveness Georg Henrik von Wright identifies pro­ haireticIogic (i. e. the logic of preference) as the core of a general theory of value concepts. Essentially, this nucleus involves the logical study of acts from the point of view of their preferability. 1 (italics added) Though the term prohairesis is found in Plato, as well as in Aristotle's treatment of the relations of preference, it is von Wright who introduces this word into contemporary analytical philoso­ phy, and succinctly specifies (...)
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