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  1. An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games.Adam Brandenburger & H. Jerome Keisler - 2006 - Studia Logica 84 (2):211-240.
    A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes that.
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  • Some non-classical approaches to the Brandenburger–Keisler paradox.Can Başkent - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (4):533-552.
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  • A Yabloesque paradox in epistemic game theory.Can Başkent - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):441-464.
    The Brandenburger–Keisler paradox is a self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which can be viewed as a two-person version of Russell’s Paradox. Yablo’s Paradox, according to its author, is a non-self referential paradox, which created a significant impact. This paper gives a Yabloesque, non-self-referential paradox for infinitary players within the context of epistemic game theory. The new paradox advances both the Brandenburger–Keisler and Yablo results. Additionally, the paper constructs a paraconsistent model satisfying the paradoxical statement.
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