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Frege on truth and judgment

Peter Pagin

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 8 (1):1-13 (2001)

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Frege's Choice: The Indefinability Argument, Truth, and the Fregean Conception of Judgment.Junyeol Kim - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (5):1-26.details I develop a new reading of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. I concentrate on what Frege literally says in the passage that contains the argument. This literal reading of the passage establishes that the indefinability argument is an arguably sound argument to the following conclusion: provided that the Fregean conception of judgment—which has recently been countered by Hanks—is correct and that truth is a property of truth-bearers, a vicious infinite regress is produced. Given this vicious regress, Frege chooses (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
The circularity reading of Frege’s indefinability argument.Junyeol Kim - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):128-136.details This paper criticizes the circularity reading of Frege's argument for the indefinability of truth. According to this reading, Frege is appealing to a sort of circularity in the argument. I argue that the circularity reading is interpretatively incorrect, or makes Frege's argument a non‐starter. Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
The epistemology of “On Sense and Reference”.Junyeol Kim - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-17.details This paper sheds light on an epistemological dimension of Frege’s “On Sense and Reference.” Under my suggested reading of it, one of its aims is to suggest a picture about propositional knowledge and its production. According to this picture, judgment, which produces propositional knowledge, is identification of the truth-value True with the reference of a given sentence. The propositional knowledge that p, produced by the judgment that p, consists in the knowledge of the identity between the True and the reference (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Frege's Conception of Logic: Truth, the True, and Assertion.Junyeol Kim - 2021 - Theoria 87 (6):1397-1417.details Gottlob Frege takes logic to be the science of truth throughout his career. However, the mature Frege makes remarks which seem to go against the idea that logic is the science of truth. This paper shows that we can explain away this tension in the mature Frege’s conception of logic if we accept that truth is an object, that is, the truth-vale True qua the reference of a sentence, for Frege. Even though the main thesis of this paper is a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The horizontal in Frege’s Begriffsschrift.Junyeol Kim - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11625-11644.details This paper addresses an issue with the sign ‘⊢’ in Frege’s mature version of Begriffsschrift, i.e., the version in ‘Function and Concept’ and Grundgesetze. The sign is a performative for asserting in that writing down ‘⊢p’ is equivalent to asserting that p. Frege further says that writing ‘ p’ is also equivalent to identifying the reference of ‘p’ with the truth-value True. It looks as if he holds that asserting that p consists in identifying the True with the reference of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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