The first part of the article examines some recent studies on the early development of social norms that examine young children’s understanding of codified rule games. It is argued that the constitutive rules than define the games cannot be identified with social norms and therefore the studies provide limited evidence about socio-normative development. The second part reviews data on children’s play in natural settings that show that children do not understand norms as codified or rules of obligation, and that the (...) norms that guide social interaction are dynamic, situated, and heterogeneous. It is argued that normativity is intersubjective and negotiable and starts to develop in the first year, emerging as a practical skill that depends on participatory engagement. Three sources of compliance are discussed: emotional engagement, nonverbal agreement, and conversation. (shrink)

Why the social ontology uses the game as paradigmatic example of social object? Is social reality a game? In this short essay, shared characteristics and differences of ludic and social acts are explored to explode the myth of the normative structure of social reality. In order to explain and demonstrate their theories, major authors of our research sector as Searle and Smith appeal to ludic phenomenons as unmistakable evidences of regulated social activities. Nevertheless well valued theorists don’t recognize that there (...) are tens of different typologies of games, about which it should be appropriate to draw up a regional ontology, as much there are tons of rule types, not always prescriptive and not always descriptive. The instant article demonstrates that social reality is not explainable by appealing to regulated behaviors, opening in this way a research context that involves the Interactive Fiction of play. Therefore the ludic phenomenon rests the base of social reality, however disconnecting it from the concept of rule, which too much influenced the research on mind, language and culture. (shrink)