Artificial agents are commonly described by using words that traditionally belong to the semantic field of organisms, particularly of animal and human life. I call this phenomenon the game of semantic extension. However, the semantic extension of words as crucial as “autonomous”, “intelligent”, “creative”, “moral”, and so on, is often perceived as unsatisfactory, which is signalled with the extensive use of inverted commas or other syntactical cues. Such practice, in turn, has provoked harsh criticism that usually refers back to the (...) literal meaning of the words to show their inappropriateness in describing artificial agents. Hence the question: how can we choose our words appropriately and wisely while making sense of artificial agents? After a brief introduction (§1), in §2 I present the starting point of my argument, which consists in the assumption that the dimensions of technology and language are deeply entangled. In §3 I discuss how this assumption impinges on the issue of choosing the right words to talk about artificial agents. §4 is an exposition of the main features of the game of semantic extension, while §5 reviews the related opportunities and risks. Finally, §6 elaborates some practical suggestions on how to play the game well. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline a proposal for assigning liability for autonomous machines modeled on the doctrine of respondeat superior. I argue that the machines’ users’ or designers’ liability should be determined by the manner in which the machines are created, which, in turn, should be responsive to considerations of the machines’ welfare interests. This approach has the twin virtues of promoting socially beneficial design of machines, and of taking their potential moral patiency seriously. I then argue for abandoning the (...) retributive approach to machine crime in favor of prioritizing restitution. I argue that this shift better conforms to what justice demands when sophisticated artificial agents of uncertain moral status are concerned. (shrink)

This paper investigates the influence that social ties can have on behavior. After defining the concept of social ties that we consider, we introduce an original model of social ties. The impact of such ties on social preferences is studied in a coordination game with outside option. We provide a detailed game theoretical analysis of this game while considering various types of players, i.e., self-interest maximizing, inequity averse, and fair agents. In addition to these approaches that require strategic reasoning in (...) order to reach some equilibrium, we also present an alternative hypothesis that relies on the concept of team reasoning. After having discussed the differences between the latter and our model of social ties, we show how an experiment can be designed so as to discriminate among the models presented in the paper. (shrink)