Kant’s Prolegomena is a piece of philosophical advertising: it exists to convince the open-minded “future teacher” of metaphysics that the true critical philosophy — i.e., the Critique — provides the only viable solution to the problem of metaphysics (i.e. its failure to make any genuine progress). To be effective, a piece of advertising needs to know its audience. This chapter argues that Kant takes his reader to have some default sympathies for the common-sense challenge to metaphysics originating from Thomas Reid (...) and his followers; this fact in turn explains his rhetorical strategies in the Prolegomena, particularly regarding the presentation of the problem of metaphysics. The chapter draws attention to the importance of Shaftesbury, who, with a nod to Horace, had argued for the deployment of humour to disarm fraudulent claims to epistemic and moral authority. Kant looks to Horace himself to poke fun at the common-sense challenge to metaphysics, and from there to indicate the general shape of the particular argumentative strategies of the Critique — that project that alone, in his view, can promise some kind of future for metaphysics. (shrink)

O presente estudo tem o propósito de descrever e analisar um elemento da crítica de Thomas Reid ao ceticismo. Em boa medida, o cerne dessa é a sua crítica à “teoria geral das ideias”. Uma parte menos explorada dessa crítica, e que é o seu pano de fundo, é a concepção reidiana sobre o método de obtenção das verdades filosóficas. Aqui, um item central é a reflexão sobre a adoção de certas “regras do filosofar” de acordo com Reid. A relevância (...) do estudo da concepção do método filosófico, em Reid, pode ser apontada ao lembrar que, em toda a construção de sua teoria sobre as fontes de conhecimento e os princípios do senso comum, as “regras” são rigorosa e universalmente aplicadas. O seu método possibilita entender, ademais, o tipo de rejeição do ceticismo epistemológico que Reid poderá construir. (shrink)

Two significant aspects of Thomas Reid's thought seem to be irreconcilable with one another. On the one hand, Reid constantly refers to the substantive benefits which human knowledge receives from the Christian revelation. On the other hand, he does not justify philosophical or scientific beliefs by way of appeal to God. In this essay, I argue that a closer inspection of both Reid's philosophical reflection and scientific investigations shows that the two aspects just mentioned are compatible with one another. In (...) short, although an influence on rational investigation is somehow exerted by divine revelation, this does not limit the autonomy of reason, which is actually stimulated and promoted precisely because of a religiously rooted confidence in our rational faculties. (shrink)