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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Criteria for basic emotions: Is DISGUST a primary “emotion”?
Cognition and Emotion 21 (8):1819-1828 (2007)
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Disgust, the emotion of rotting carcasses and slimy animalitos, finds itself at the center of several critical questions about human culture and cognition. This article summarizes recent developments, identify active points of debate, and provide an account of where the field is heading next. |
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A cross-species affective neuroscience strategy for understanding the primary-process (basic) emotions is defended. The need for analyzing the brain and mind in terms of evolutionary stratification of functions into at least primary (instinctual), secondary (learned), and tertiary (thought-related) processes is advanced. When viewed in this context, the contentious battles between basic-emotion theorists and dimensional-constructivist approaches can be seen to be largely nonsubstantial differences among investigators working at different levels of analysis. |
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A recent paper by Tom Stern suggests that Socrates’s philosophical psychology, which emphasizes rational reflection, is superior to Nietzsche’s drive model when explaining human behavior. I argue that Stern’s analysis is wrong on three fronts. First, the models share common, though inverted, features. Second, Stern fails to consider the role of Socrates’s daimon when evaluating Socrates’s philosophy of mind; third, Nietzsche’s model is more warranted. In sum, Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology is a correction of the Socratic. |
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A special area of human-machine interaction, the expression of emotions gains importance with the continuous development of artificial agents such as social robots or interactive mobile applications. We developed a prototype version of an abstract emotion visualization agent to express five basic emotions and a neutral state. In contrast to well-known symbolic characters (e.g., smileys) these displays follow general biological and ethological rules. We conducted a multiple questionnaire study on the assessment of the displays with Hungarian and Japanese subjects. In (...) |
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Aesthetic perception is one of the most interesting topics for philosophers and scientists who investigate how it influences our interactions with objects and states of affairs. Over the last few years, several studies have attempted to determine “how aesthetics is represented in an object,” and how a specific feature of an object could evoke the respective feelings during perception. Despite the vast number of approaches and models, we believe that these explanations do not resolve the problem concerning the conditions under (...) |
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Exploring emotions, in terms of their evolutionary origin; their basic neurobiological substratum, and their functional significance in autonomous agents, we propose a model of minimal functionality of emotions. Our aim is to provide a naturalized explanation – mostly based on an interactivist model of emergent representation and appraisal theory of emotions – concerning basic aesthetic emotions in the formation of aesthetic judgment. We suggest two processes the Cognitive Variables Subsystem (CVS) which is fundamental for the accomplishment of the function of (...) |
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En la filosofía y psicología actual existe una discusión actualmente de vital importancia para la comprensión del ser humano, esto es la relación entre las emociones y la vida moral. En este contexto Martha Nussbaum ofrece importantes puntos de reflexión que nos llevan a preguntarnos por aquellas facultades cognitivas que estructuran las emociones morales como la compasión y que diferencian la expresión emocional humana de la de animales no humanos. |
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Disgust, the emotion of rotting carcasses and slimy animalitos, finds itself at the center of several critical questions about human culture and cognition. This article summarizes recent developments, identify active points of debate, and provide an account of where the field is heading next. |
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