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  1. Virtue.Maria Silvia Vaccarezza - 2022 - In Silvia Caprioglio Panizza & Mark Hopwood (eds.), The Murdochian Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 183-196.
    Was Iris Murdoch a virtue ethicist? At first sight, it would appear that she was not. She does not offer an explicit definition of account of the term ‘virtue’, and there are significant differences between her views and those of standard Aristotelian virtue ethicists. There is no reason, however, to think that the standard Aristotelian view represents the only legitimate form of virtue ethics. In this chapter, I begin by recalling (in section 1) the main commonalities between Murdoch’s criticisms of (...)
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  • Reconceiving Murdochian Realism.Cathy Mason - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10:649-672.
    It can be tempting to read Iris Murdoch as subscribing to the same position as standard contemporary moral realists. Her language is often similar to theirs and they share some key commitments, most importantly the rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, it is a mistake to assume that her realism amounts to the same thing theirs does. In this paper I offer a sketch of her alternative conception of realism, which centres on the idea that truth and reality are fundamentally (...)
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  • Overcoming the Fantasy of Human Supremacy: Toward a Murdochian Theory of Change in Nonideal Animal Ethics.Kristian Cantens - 2024 - Journal of Animal Ethics 14 (1):26-44.
    How may we change ourselves and our society so that animals are treated more justly? To answer this question, I turn to the account of moral change developed by the philosopher Iris Murdoch. The chief obstacle to becoming better, she believed, is an attachment to fantasy, from which we are liberated only through a loving attention directed at the reality of other beings. Building on this account, I argue that human supremacy is one such fantasy—that it acts as an impediment (...)
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  • Moral Perception as Imaginative Apprehension.Yanni Ratajczyk - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-20.
    Moral perception is typically understood as moral properties perception, i.e., the perceptual registration of moral properties such as wrongness or dignity. In this article, I defend a view of moral perception as a process that involves imaginative apprehension of reality. It is meant as an adjustment to the dominant view of moral perception as moral properties perception and as an addition to existing Murdochian approaches to moral perception. The view I present here builds on Iris Murdoch’s moral psychology and holds (...)
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  • Perception, Self, and Zen: On Iris Murdoch and the Taming of Simone Weil.Silvia Caprioglio Panizza - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (64):64.
    How do we see the world aright? This question is central to Iris Murdoch’s philosophy as well as to that of her great source of inspiration, Simone Weil. For both of them, not only our action, but the very quality of our being depends on the ability to see things as they are, where vision is both a metaphor for immediate understanding and a literal expression of the requirement to train our perception so as to get rid of illusions. For (...)
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  • How to Undo (and Redo) Words with Facts: A Semio-enactivist Approach to Law, Space and Experience.Mario Ricca - 2022 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 36 (1):313-367.
    In this essay both the facts/values and facticity/normativity divides are considered from the perspective of global semiotics and with specific regard to the relationships between legal meaning and spatial scope of law’s experience. Through an examination of the inner and genetic projective significance of categorization, I will analyze the semantic dynamics of the descriptive parts comprising legal sentences in order to show the intermingling of factual and axiological/teleological categorizations in the unfolding of legal experience. Subsequently, I will emphasize the translational (...)
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  • Moral Enhancement Is Irrational.Stephen Napier - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):653-665.
    Debates on moral enhancement focus legitimate attention on the questions of whether it is possible and/or what could count as a moral enhancement given deep ethical disagreement. I argue here that moral enhancements might not even be rational to consider—from the perspective of the agent. At issue is the assessment of whether the enhancement is truly reliable. Since we assess reliable belief forming processes by their outputs, whether they are true, an agent who is entertaining a putative moral enhancement faces (...)
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