The article exposes the analysis of different socio-philosophical approaches to the fixation of a rule in contemporary praxis. It clarifies the status and role of the rule as a notion in practical philosophy. The author compares the advantages of neo-Aristotelian, neo-Kantian and socio-critical approaches to the revelation of valid forms of praxis rules. In the framework of social philosophy, the article demonstrates the interdependency and succession of these approaches to the interpretation of the essence of the practical rule. The renaissance (...) of the Aristotelean definition of praxis is considered in the works by E. Stein and A. MacIntyre. The relevance of the neo-Kantian approach to the revelation of the nature of practical rule in contemporary social theory is justified on the basis of works by R. Jaeggi, E. von Redecker and J. Butler. The author traces the productive interaction between the neo-Aristotelean and the neo-Kantian approaches to defining praxis rules. Special attention is paid to the philosophy of H. Lotze and E. Lask, where is accomplished the practical turn from the Aristotelean accomplished deed itself to the Kantian judgement about a value of this or that form fulfillment. The dominance of the axiological approach to praxis in contemporary social theory is problematised by means of the neo-Aristotelean interpretation, which prevents its alienation from the essence of the virtue action. The late modern characteristic forms of the practical rule fulfillment in creative activity are considered. There is justified the necessity of turning the theory of practices to the neo-Kantian and the neo-Aristotelean traditions in order to reveal valid forms of expressing and preserving the value-normative nature of rules in contemporary society. That can partially overcome the pragmatic relativism of the theory of practices, which neglects the traditional sense of the praxis rule in its situational intersubjective interpretation. Taking into account complexity and non-linear development of social reality, as well as of the variety of approaches to its reflection, there is explicated the relevance of the determination of contextually possible and universally necessary forms of praxis rules, which are justifiable as value meaningful. (shrink)