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Peirce and Russell on Proper Names

Helmut Pape

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18 (4):339 - 348 (1982)

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Peirce's Direct, Non-Reductive Contextual Theory of Names.David W. Agler - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (4):611-640.details One dimension of a comprehensive semantic and semiotic theory is its explanation of how a wide-variety of linguistic expressions designate singular objects. The bulk of scholarship on Peirce's theory of proper names has aligned his theory with the so called new theory of reference by drawing connections between proper names qua rhematic indexical legisigns and various aspects of Kripke's theory of names.2 Recent scholarship has navigated away from indexing Kripke-Peirce affinities and has begun the process of articulating a semiotic or (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Peirce's final account of signs and the philosophy of language.Albert Atkin - 2008 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (1):pp. 63-85.details In this paper I examine parallels between C.S. Peirce's most mature account of signs and contemporary philosophy of language. I do this by first introducing a summary of Peirce's final account of Signs. I then use that account of signs to reconstruct Peircian answers to two puzzles of reference: The Problem of Cognitive Significance, or Frege's Puzzle; and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Finally, a comparison of these Peircian answers with both Fregean and Direct Referentialist approaches to the puzzles highlights (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
A Peircean examination of Gettier’s two cases.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12945-12961.details If we accept certain Peircean commitments, Gettier’s two cases are not cases of justified true belief because the beliefs are not true. On the Peircean view, propositions are sign substitutes, or “representamens.” In typical cases of thought about the world, propositions represent facts. In each of Gettier’s examples, we have a case in which a person S believes some proposition p, there is some fact F* such that were p to represent F* to S then p would be true, and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Peirce on facts and true propositions.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6):1176-1192.details Peirce maintains that facts and propositions are structurally isomorphic. When we understand how Peirce thinks they are isomorphic, we find that a common objection raised against epistemic conceptions of truth – that there are facts beyond the ken of discovery – holds no water against Peirce’s claim that truth is what would be believed after a sufficiently long and rigorous course of inquiry. Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations

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