In this paper, I argue that hinge propositions are ways of acting that constitute abilities or skills. My starting point is Moyal-Sharrock's account of hinge propositions. However, Moyal-Sharrock's account leaves gaps to be filled, as it does not offer a unified explanation of the origin of our ungrounded grounds. Her account also lacks resources to respond to the issue of demarcation, since it does not provide a criterion for distinguishing ways of acting that can legitimately fulfill the role of ungrounded (...) grounds from those that cannot. Without an answer to this issue, the relativistic threat is serious. I then propose that by narrowing the ways of acting to those that are constitutive of abilities, we can deal with the relativistic threat. I provide an ecological approach to abilities through which I explain why abilities are reality-soaked and therefore why the ways of acting that constitute them are legitimate ungrounded grounds. Based on that approach, I provide an answer to the issue of demarcation that defuses the relativistic threat. (shrink)

In the present article we subscribe to a form of meta-skepticism according to which the theory of knowledge is impossible. This form of meta-skepticism is based on two apparently necessary conditions: the identification of one or more of the assumptions of the theory of knowledge in order to criticize them; and the more or less explicit assumption that there is an alternative account of knowledge to the one attributed to the theory of knowledge in question. Once these preliminary issues have (...) been clarified, we will review different varieties of meta-skepticism in order to verify whether all of them, even the most austere, satisfy the previous two conditions. This will lead us to conclude, in the first place, that all varieties of meta-skepticism satisfy them and, secondly, that no type of meta-skepticism is free of epistemological implications. In the light of this conclusion, we will end up considering whether meta-skepticism stands its ground. (shrink)

This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style skepticism about our knowledge of extra-mental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global skeptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are.

This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style skepticism about our knowledge of extra-mental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global skeptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are.