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Authority and Harm

Jonathan Parry

Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy 3:252-278 (2017)

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Costly authority and transferred responsibility.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3579-3595.details Revisionist just war theorists maintain that, soldiers, and not merely their leaders or superiors, bear moral responsibility for objectively wrongful harms imposed in pursuit of an unjust war. The conviction that underlies revisionism is that a person's responsibility for her intentional, objectively unjustified, killing is non-transferable. In this essay I aim to elaborate a specific counterexample to this general claim. I will argue that in cases that I characterize as "special authority cases", the moral responsibility for the unintended outcomes that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Immigration enforcement and justifications for causing harm.Kevin K. W. Ip - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.details States are not only claiming the right to grant or deny entry to their territories but also enforcing this right against non-citizens in ways that cause significant harm to these individuals. In this article, I argue that endorsing the presumptive right to restrict immigration does not settle the question of when or how it may permissibly inflict harm on individuals to enforce this right. I examine three distinct justifications for causing harm to individuals. First, the justification of defensive harm holds (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Mistaken authority and obligation.Luciano Venezia - 2020 - Legal Theory 26 (4):338-351.details Massimo Renzo argues that, as long as it is acting in good faith, an authority can issue orders that require subjects to act in ways that are morally wrong and still be acting within the scope of its jurisdiction, so that the orders are binding. This, however, is incorrect. If the authority is permitted to issue an order, it is acting within the scope of its jurisdiction and so the order creates an obligation. But if the authority is not permitted (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Unjust combatants, special authority, and “transferred responsibility”.Luciano Venezia & Rodrigo Sánchez Brígido - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2187-2198.details Yitzhak Benbaji argues that those combatants who have agreed to blindly obey their superiors and who are ordered to fight in unjust wars are released from their duty to deliberate about the merits of the acts that they are ordered to perform. This is because their agreements result in the combatants’ permissible lack of a necessary capacity for moral responsibility. Thus, the combatants are not morally responsible for their wrongful acts—their moral responsibility is “transferred” to their superiors. We argue, first, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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