The aim of this text is to elucidate the concept of citizenship of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This conception of citizenship can be denominated like Republican. For this, the concept of citizenship in Rousseau is addressed in three fundamental principles: freedom, equality and fraternity. Some traditional political conceptions of contractualism as Hobbes and Locke are considered, especially in relation to their conceptions of citizen. Following this, those fundamental aspects of the anthropology conceived by Rousseau are realized. Those allow to reach at the (...) construction of his idea of republic. In addition, the three fundamental principles, that characterize citizenship in the republican sense, are developed. And so the conclusion is the formulation of a truly democratic state from the perspective of Rousseau, inspired by the republican state of the ancients and where the people is properly the legislator of this. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyze the citizenship proposed by Rousseau in light of certain delimitations placed by the philosopher to the exercise of this right, which configure a kind of political participation that would be appropriate to the regime described in the Social Contract. So, I intend to show that popular sovereignty has, for the Genevan writer, a key role in defending the legislation, and that it is up to the Lawgiver and to the magistrates guide citizens (...) in approving the good laws necessary for the State. This thesis is consistent with Rousseau’s republicanism, since it shows that these citizens, members of the social compact, are responsible for protecting and preserving their own freedom throughout the existence of the political body. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe article compares Rousseau’s and Wollstonecraft’s views on the imagination. It is argued that though Wollstonecraft was evidently influenced by Rousseau, there are significant differences between their views. These differences are grounded in their different views on the faculty of reason and its relation to the passions. Whereas Rousseau characterizes reason as a derivative faculty, grounded in the more primary faculty of perfectibility, Wollstonecraft perceives reason as the faculty defining human nature. It is argued that contrary to what is often (...) assumed, Wollstonecraft’s conception of the imagination is not primarily characterized by its Romantic features, but rather by the close affinity she posits between reason and the imagination. This close affinity has several consequences. One consequence is that she is less worried than Rousseau about the imagination wandering without external constrains, because she believes in reason’s ability to guide the imagination by choosing its objects. Ultimately the difference between Rousseau’s and Wollstonecraft’s views on the imagination helps us understand why she was a passionate philosopher of the Enlightenment while he was one of its first, perceptive and most articulate critics. (shrink)

Historizing Subjectivity in Childhood Studies.

In my dissertation, I engage in a political history of waste; in particular I look at modern philosophers from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and the way that waste functions alongside narratives of civilization, progress, and perfection. I analyze the political, pedagogical, and other theories of John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. I use Julia Kristevaâs concept of abjection to trace the legacies of these philosophers to the continued and continuing practices of wasting life their work (...) supports and maintains. Social contract theory must have its others, those wasted and abjected to limn the boundary of the âclean and properâ civilized order. Locke abjects waste in his theory of property and I link the use of his term âwastelandâ to the wastelanding of Native Americans. As Kristeva says the forgetting, repressing, or disavowal of abjection leads to the return of its repressed in the form of our âapocalypses.â I discuss Rousseauâs treatment of waste and the way it is ambivalently embraced, which I think is a more appropriate treatment of waste. I also compare Emile and Sophieâs education and argue that his education of women makes waste of their lives. Last, I discuss Kantâs theory of waste and race together, arguing that he redeems all waste and that he makes waste of all races except the white race. He assents to the use of people of color as means for the white raceâs ends, rather than treating them as ends in themselves. Thus, I conclude that social contract theories are wasteful of life and lives and that contract theory should be garbaged for a new political principle: to not make waste of life or lives. (shrink)

This paper presents a functional genealogy of essentialist authenticity. The essentialist account maintains that authenticity is the result of discovering and realizing one’s ‘true self’. The genealogy shows that essentialist authenticity can serve the function of supporting continuity in one’s individual characteristics. A genealogy of essentialist authenticity is not only methodologically interesting as the first functional genealogy of a contingent concept. It can also deepen the functional understanding of authenticity used in neuroethics, provide a possible explanation for the prevalence of (...) the idea of an essentialist true self and justify the use of the ideal of authenticity. First, essentialist authenticity is defined and explained through the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Second, a general need to have steady characteristics is derived from basic human practices. Third, circumstances that make it more challenging to steady oneself are identified and shown to have become more prevalent in the age of modernity when the ideal of authenticity emerged. Finally, it is shown how essentialist authenticity helps to steady the self. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWe can easily misread historical texts if we take ideas and passages out of their textual contexts. The resulting errors are widespread, possibly even more so than errors through reading ideas and passages out of their historical contexts. Yet the methodological literature stresses the latter and says little about the former. This paper thus theorises the idea of textual context, distinguishes three types of textual context, and asks how we uncover the right textual contexts. I distinguish four kinds of textual-context (...) error, and offer practical tips for avoiding these errors. However, the beating heart of this paper is the history–philosophy debate: in contrast to the prevailing assumption that historical and philosophical analysis are fundamentally different, I show that a commitment to textual context, which should be entirely uncontroversial, also commits one to think philosophically. (shrink)

Rousseau é reconhecido como um dos grandes filósofos da nossa tradição ocidental, sobretudo pelo impacto que os seus ideais tiveram na definição da ideologia moderna de viés republicano e até mesmo liberal. Porém, apesar da defesa incansável daqueles que viriam a ser os ideais revolucionários franceses, Rousseau insiste em manter uma prática de desigualdade naturalizada, considerando as mulheres como inferiores e eternas desiguais dos homens. Mary Wollstonecraft foi a primeira a fazer a denúncia da contradição do pensamento de Rousseau, na (...) obra que viria a ser o marco de uma literatura feminista: A Vindication for the Rights of Women. Porém, até mesmo esta denúncia está circunscrita àquele horizonte que Rousseau contribuira para desenhar: o horizonte da universalidade dos direitos, das liberdades e da igualdade. Neste artigo queremos caracterizar esta contradição levando em conta contribuições recentes de críticas feministas e apontando sua relação com o projeto democrático mais vasto. (shrink)