This article re-orients Heidegger’s analyses of things to cast light on two distinct ways of relating to things, one at the root of technological use and the other crucial to artistic creation. The first way, which we may call instrumental practice, denotes the activity of using something to accomplish some goal or objective. This practice underlies the analysis of use-things [Zeuge] that Heidegger presents in Being and Time. Heidegger’s contribution there is twofold: to show how understanding things as zuhanden, there (...) for us, is prior to taking things as objects in “nature,” and to clarify how the “phenomenon of the world” can show itself when a useful thing becomes dysfunctional. But Heidegger’s focus on the thing as zuhanden leaves in the dark a second kind of practice that we engage in when we relate to things, the practice of attending to an activity for its own sake, as I illustrate by the using or making of four things: the hammer, the Daoist cook’s cleaver, the Daoist-inspired empty jug or Krug, and the Japanese calligrapher’s brush. Heidegger’s dialogue on Gelassenheit anticipates but also cuts short this practice of attention: gelassenes Denken—the thinking that lets go of representations and expectations and simply lets things be—promises to open a way to experience our essential nature [Wesen], but the dialogue’s focus on things as already there or already made distracts from the practice of attention that goes into the art of making things like jugs. By re-orienting Heidegger’s thinking we are able to recast the question of technology: can the practice of attention performed for its own sake—caring for things simply to care for them, caring for the surrounding world simply to care for it—help salvage not only the environment but the very essence of being human? (shrink)

in German Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich zwei Schriften Heideggers, die bisher kaum untersucht worden sind, nämlich Die Einzigkeit des Dichters und Abendgespräch in einem Kriegsgefangenenlager in Rußland zwischen einem Jüngeren und einem Älteren. Diese Schriften sind vor allem insofern bemerkenswert, als der taoistische Gedanke der Notwendigkeit des Unnötigen in ihrem Zentrum steht. Heideggers Rezeption dieses Gedankens ist, wie im vorliegenden Beitrag gezeigt wird, aber keine bloße Aufnahme, sondern vielmehr eine schöpferische Aneignung des ostasiatischen Gedankengutes für sein eigenes Seinsdenken. Zunächst (...) wird Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit dem Gedanken der Notwendigkeit des Unnötigen dargestellt. Danach wird versucht, im Anschluss an Heideggers Kunstphilosophie darüber nachzudenken, inwiefern das Kunstwerk als das Unnötige in der Leistungsgesellschaft notwendig ist. Abstract in English: The present contribution analyses two writings of Heidegger which have almost never been examined until now: The Uniqueness of the Poet and Evening Conversation: In a Prisoner of War Camp in Russia between a Younger and an Older Man. These writings are very important for the comparative study of Heidegger's philosophy and East Asian thinking, not least because they are based on the Taoist idea of the necessity of the unnecessary. Heidegger's reception of this idea is, as shown in this contribution, not simply a bare adoption, but rather a creative appropriation of East Asian thought for his own thinking of Being. First, this contribution shows Heidegger's confrontation with the idea of wuyongzhiyong. It then attempts to reflect on the extent to which the artwork, as that which seems to be useless, is necessary in a results-oriented society by looking at Heidegger's philosophy of art. (shrink)

This article re-orients Heidegger's analyses of things to cast light on two distinct ways of relating to things, one at the root of technological use and the other crucial to artistic creation. The first way, which we may call instrumental practice, denotes the activity of using something to accomplish some goal or objective. This practice underlies the analysis of use-things [Zeuge] that Heidegger presents in Being and Time. Heidegger's contribution there is twofold: to show how understanding things as zuhanden, there (...) for us, is prior to taking things as objects in "nature," and to clarify how the "phenomenon of the world" can show itself when a useful thing becomes dysfunctional. But Heidegger's focus on the thing as zuhanden leaves in the dark a second kind of practice that we engage in when we relate to things, the practice of attending to an activity for its own sake, as I illustrate by the using or making of four things: the hammer, the Daoist cook's cleaver, the Daoist-inspired empty jug or Krug, and the Japanese calligrapher's brush. Heidegger's dialogue on Gelassenheit anticipates but also cuts short this practice of attention: gelassenes Denken—the thinking that lets go of representations and expectations and simply lets things be—promises to open a way to experience our essential nature [Wesen], but the dialogue's focus on things as already there or already made distracts from the practice of attention that goes into the art of making things like jugs. By re-orienting Heidegger's thinking we are able to recast the question of technology: can the practice of attention performed for its own sake—caring for things simply to care for them, caring for the surrounding world simply to care for it—help salvage not only the environment but the very essence of being human? (shrink)

Gadamer’s notion of dialogical truth relies on the claim that self and world “belong together” as aspects of a single, unitary phenomenon, one which is made manifest in language. This view has difficulty, however, accounting for that which is untruthful. To get past this obstacle I suggest that we turn to Nishida’s work, which shows how we can bring self and world together into a kind of harmony such that the cultivation of perception makes possible truthful expression.