Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Non-Classical Probabilities Invariant Under Symmetries.Alexander R. Pruss - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8507-8532.
    Classical real-valued probabilities come at a philosophical cost: in many infinite situations, they assign the same probability value—namely, zero—to cases that are impossible as well as to cases that are possible. There are three non-classical approaches to probability that can avoid this drawback: full conditional probabilities, qualitative probabilities and hyperreal probabilities. These approaches have been criticized for failing to preserve intuitive symmetries that can be preserved by the classical probability framework, but there has not been a systematic study of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A Classical Way Forward for the Regularity and Normalization Problems.Alexander R. Pruss - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):11769-11792.
    Bayesian epistemology has struggled with the problem of regularity: how to deal with events that in classical probability have zero probability. While the cases most discussed in the literature, such as infinite sequences of coin tosses or continuous spinners, do not actually come up in scientific practice, there are cases that do come up in science. I shall argue that these cases can be resolved without leaving the realm of classical probability, by choosing a probability measure that preserves “enough” regularity. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Weintraub’s Response to Williamson’s Coin Flip Argument.Matthew W. Parker - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-21.
    A probability distribution is regular if it does not assign probability zero to any possible event. Williamson argued that we should not require probabilities to be regular, for if we do, certain “isomorphic” physical events must have different probabilities, which is implausible. His remarks suggest an assumption that chances are determined by intrinsic, qualitative circumstances. Weintraub responds that Williamson’s coin flip events differ in their inclusion relations to each other, or the inclusion relations between their times, and this can account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consequentialism in Infinite Worlds.Adam Jonsson & Martin Peterson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):240-248.
    We show that in infinite worlds the following three conditions are incompatible: The spatiotemporal ordering of individuals is morally irrelevant. All else being equal, the act of bringing about a good outcome with a high probability is better than the act of bringing about the same outcome with a low probability. One act is better than another only if there is a nonzero probability that it brings about a better outcome. The impossibility of combining these conditions shows that it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Fair Infinite Lotteries, Qualitative Probability, and Regularity.Nicholas DiBella - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (4):824-844.
    A number of philosophers have thought that fair lotteries over countably infinite sets of outcomes are conceptually incoherent by virtue of violating countable additivity. In this article, I show that a qualitative analogue of this argument generalizes to an argument against the conceptual coherence of a much wider class of fair infinite lotteries—including continuous uniform distributions. I argue that this result suggests that fair lotteries over countably infinite sets of outcomes are no more conceptually problematic than continuous uniform distributions. Along (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Infinite Lotteries, Spinners, Applicability of Hyperreals†.Emanuele Bottazzi & Mikhail G. Katz - forthcoming - Philosophia Mathematica.
    We analyze recent criticisms of the use of hyperreal probabilities as expressed by Pruss, Easwaran, Parker, and Williamson. We show that the alleged arbitrariness of hyperreal fields can be avoided by working in the Kanovei–Shelah model or in saturated models. We argue that some of the objections to hyperreal probabilities arise from hidden biases that favor Archimedean models. We discuss the advantage of the hyperreals over transferless fields with infinitesimals. In Paper II we analyze two underdetermination theorems by Pruss and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations