In this essay I bring together Lacan, Žižek, Deleuze and Guattari as mediators and intercessors for one another. The tensions that exist between them still continue to reverberate throughout the academic community. The intent is to query their pedagogies in what they are trying to ‘do’ within the context of capitalism in particular. I have called their pedagogies anomalous in keeping with their thrust of becoming other in their own particular ways through what I take to be three pedagogical conceptual (...) personae: saint, jester and nomad. I try to show how Deleuze and Guattari managed to supplant and perhaps overcome Lacan's own pedagogical project to have psychoanalysis as a way out from capitalism, which has been continued today by Žižek. I do this by showing how Lacan's mathemes, used in his four discourses, can be understood as having been deterritorialised by Deleuze and Guattari to present us with a counter-actualised pedagogy that challenges psychoanalysis as presented by both Lacan and Žižek. Nevertheless, reconciliations between the thought of Deleuze, Guattari and Lacan are possible. The reader will also find that particular door open, yet not fully explored here. (shrink)

This article argues that an engagement with the powerful critical insights of Žižek’s theory of ideology and practice of cultural critique is a necessary step for any art historical methodology which aims to fully account for a work of art’s function within the society of its creation and reception, and to explain how it came to play such a role. However, any attempt to situate cultural artefacts within historically contingent networks of social relations requires an account of historical change incompatible (...) with any formalist or transcendentalist methodology. Moreover, if it is to be of any use as an academic discourse, art history must be able to account for the specifities of ‘art’ as a distinct—but not autonomous—sphere of human activity. It is precisely these two issues that a wholesale importation of Žižek’s writing into the domain of art history encounters. A solution must be found whereby the critical lessons of Žižek are not ‘lost in translation’. In this vein, the present article begins by outlining Žižek’s conception of ideology and elucidating the problematic consequences of any straightforward application of its parameters as an art historical methodology. It then reads the interventions of Jacques Rancière and Judith Butler as providing the necessary theoretical tools by which one can construct the possibility of a powerful Žižekian art historical methodology. (shrink)

Since the advent of a post-structuralist ethos, the assertion of a notion of truth, conceived as an infallible point d’appui from which a given social order could be evaluated as ideological or non-ideological, seems no longer possible. As Rorty has pointed out ‘[we can now] see ourselves as never encountering reality except under a chosen description as…making worlds rather than finding them’. However, we could still legitimately ask whether or not an inevitable condition of the ‘post-modern world’, that is, a (...) world deprived of a manifest intrinsic meaning, is the renouncement of the assumption of a certain notion of an objective truth for a critique of ideology. I will suggest in this essay that a way to respond to this question is by revisiting Habermas's theory of communicative action, viewed through the lens of the theory of ideology formulated by Slavok Žižek. Furthermore, the main thesis of this work is that by using the notion of the Real or ‘primordial repressed’ taken from a Žižekian reading of Lacan, it would allow the production of a critique of ideology in which the truth — the unmasking of the extra-ideological place — becomes possible as a hypothetical objective category. (shrink)

For Zizek, considering Hegel's philosophy as the culmination of absolute systematization and idealism which ultimately dissolves the diversity of reality into absolute idea and knowledge, is a cursory judgment of his philosophy. Zizek argues it is possible to remove the stains of absolutistic perception from Hegel's thought by using Lacan. Accordingly, Zizek’s reading of Hegel's subject, unlike his predecessor and contemporary thinkers, takes place in the space of Lacanian concepts and the context of the real. In this respect, the Hegelian (...) subject is not a pre-predicative thing and it doesn’t have a priori coherence, but it is always bounded by the conditions of the external occurrence. The existence of the subject is the product of an abstract totalitarian negation that challenges the authoritarian and totalitarian structure of the substantial order. Lacan's excuse for rereading Hegel is not because Zizek assumes Hegel is trapped in a kind of semantic and structural self-referential subjugation. Rather, he always identifies a kind of surplus in Hegel's philosophy of spirit which can only be analyzed by using Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts. Zizek takes Hegel's dialectic from the level of the logic of the signifier, in which desire is recognized through the other and the subject is digested as the subject of a sign in the symbolic order, to the level of Lacan's logic in which there is no big and perfect other. It is always incomplete, barred, and not-all structured around a fundamental lack. According to Zizek, there is the real in the subject which is not impossible, and a desire does not fit in the framework of the production of fantasy, signifier and big other, and this is exactly the point where the subject is formed. (shrink)

“Laughing at Finitude” interprets Slavoj Žižek’s intellectual project as responding to a challenge left by Being and Time. Setting out from discussions of Heidegger’s book in The Parallax View and The Ticklish Subject, the essay exfoliates Žižek’s response to the Heideggerian version of a “philosophy of finitude”—both finding the central insight of Žižek’s work in Heidegger’s radical proposal for “anticipatory resoluteness” and developing Žižek’s critique of Being and Time as indicating Heidegger’s retreat from that proposal within the very book where (...) it appears. Žižek reads Being and Time’s existential thematic as proposing a radical subjectivism and, unlike other Heidegger-critics, praises this aspect of the project. Indeed, Žižek claims that the weakness of Being and Time as a whole is that it is insufficiently radical in its subjectivism. For him, Heidegger is a thinker of ambiguous value, one who develops a program from whose own demands he hides. “Laughing at Finitude” both articulates this accusation of self-deception in Heidegger and examines the imperatives necessary to avoid it, for a dialectical shift from the “tragic” voice in existential treatments of finitude and for a revolutionary collectivist re-conception of social “Mitsein.” It suggests, in the process, Žižek’s own intellectual itinerary. (shrink)