The paper shows how Karl Popper's critique of 'historicism' is permeated by psychoanalytic discourse regardless of his critique that psychoanalysis is one of the exemplars of pseudoscience. Early on, when he was formulating his philosophy of science, Popper had an apparently stringent criterion, viz. falsifiablity, and painstaking analysis. The central argument of this paper is that despite his representation of psychoanalysis as the principal illustration of the category he dubs as 'pseudoscience', Popper's analysis has been infused with psychoanalysis when it (...) comes to his social and political philosophy. Besides, not only was his interpretation of the proponents of 'historicism' and the 'closed' society mediated by the very concepts of a field which he indicted as pseudoscientific but also he frequently slipped into vacuous and unverifiable accusations forgetting the jurisdiction he formerly accorded to empirical adequacy and logical consistency when examining and assessing theories. (shrink)

Článek interpretuje konjekturální paradigma Carla Ginzburga z pozice hermeneutiky. Rozšiřuje východiska teorie s pozorností k fenomenologické kritice moderní vědy na základě prohloubení distinkce mezi galileovskou vědou a konjekturální metodou. Studie obhajuje vědeckost historie na základě širší diskuse o východiscích teorie, v konfrontaci s Popperovou kritikou její prediktivní hodnoty. Článek argumentuje, že historie jako věda je možná pouze tehdy, je-li opuštěn teoretický univerzalismus.