Mathematics has a long track record of refining the concepts by which we make sense of the world. For example, mathematics allows one to speak about different senses of "sameness", depending on the larger context. Phenomenology is the name of a philosophical discipline that tries to systematically investigate the first-personal perspective on reality and how it is constituted. Together, mathematics and phenomenology seem to be a good fit to derive statements about our experience that are, at the same time, well-defined, (...) precise, and significant to our inner lives. However, there are difficulties stemming from the fact that phenomenology deals with inherently subjective things. Phenomenological investigations seem to lose their appeal when trying to approach them in the clear-cut way afforded by mathematics. How to overcome this obstacle? We argue that the Arts play a special role in mediating between the precise statements of mathematics and the sometimes fuzzy nature of our experience. Mathematics and art are complementary ways to come to a comprehensive understanding of reality. (shrink)

This paper argues that through the conceptual distinctions between 'immanence' and 'transcendence' in The Idea of Phenomenology and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, a proper understanding of transcendental idealism and 'transcendence in immanence' can avoid any metaphysical commitments of internalism or externalism, and reconfigure the debate on internalism and externalism by providing an alternative option. There are two interpretations towards whether Husserl is an internalist. The first one is that Husserl is an internalist as he employs the reduction method in (...) order to 'returns to the inner mind'. The second interpretation, which is most welcomed by Husserlians, refutes the internalistic interpretation of Husserl and argues that neither internalism nor externalism can faithfully understand Husserl's phenomenology because Husserl's phenomenology does not tie to any tradition metaphysical commitment. Although I share this view, but an important text, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is neglected by the previous debates. In the text, it does not only reexamine the two levels of 'immanence' and 'transcendence' in The Idea of Phenomenology, but also introduces one more level of 'immanence' and 'transcendence'. I shall argue that by the reconsideration of the three levels of immanence and transcendence, Husserl does not disconnect 'transcendence', so he cannot simply be employed into internalism, on the one hand; his phenomenology provides an alternative option rather than internalism or externalism. (shrink)

Our experience of the present is defined by numbers, graphs and, increasingly, an algorithmically calculated future, based on the mathematical and formal reasoning that began with the rise of modern science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Today, this reasoning is further modified and extended in the form of computer-executed, algorithmic reasoning. Instead of fallible human reasoning, algorithms—based on mining databases for ‘information’—are seen to provide more efficient processes, offering fast solutions. In this paper, then, I will follow Jan Patočka, (...) who suggests that we live in an age of supercivilisation, one in which human reasoning has become self-sufficient, ceasing to depend on the supernatural or cultural traditions that previously guided human lives. My argument is that Patočka’s analysis of supercivilisation can open up a different way to reflect on the ‘spiritual foundation of our times’. As Patočka says, to reflect on our situation does not mean that we can change it, but reflection can give us a new understanding that will open up different ways to think about our human future. (shrink)

Locke claims that a person’s identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article draws on (...) phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one’s own body, but also possibly as “other” or “strange.” Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the “mineness” of the body and its “alterity” are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one’s own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person. (shrink)

This paper argues that through the conceptual distinctions between ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in The Idea of Phenomenology and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, a proper understanding of transcendental idealism and ‘transcendence in immanence’ can avoid any metaphysical commitments of internalism or externalism, and reconfigure the debate on internalism and externalism by providing an alternative option. There are two interpretations towards whether Husserl is an internalist. The first one is that Husserl is an internalist as he employs the reduction method in (...) order to ‘returns to the inner mind’. The second interpretation, which is most welcomed by Husserlians, refutes the internalistic interpretation of Husserl and argues that neither internalism nor externalism can faithfully understand Husserl’s phenomenology because Husserl’s phenomenology does not tie to any tradition metaphysical commitment. Although I share this view, but an important text, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is neglected by the previous debates. In the text, it does not only reexamine the two levels of ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in The Idea of Phenomenology, but also introduces one more level of ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’. I shall argue that by the reconsideration of the three levels of immanence and transcendence, Husserl does not disconnect ‘transcendence’, so he cannot simply be employed into internalism, on the one hand; his phenomenology provides an alternative option rather than internalism or externalism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJan Patočka is known as a philosophical analyst of the phenomenological concept of the live-word, which contradicts the preoccupations expressed in Sir Herbert Read’s Art of Sc...

Jan Patočka starts the phenomenology of existence movement as a response to the crisis brought about by modern technology. This movement aims to liberate both humanity and the world from the absolute dominance of technologism, while addressing the spiritual crisis faced by human beings. Patočka offers a new phenomenological perspective on human existence, viewing it as a continuous movement. He emphasizes that human embodiment in the world is characterized by an existential movement, which involves rootedness, self-extension, and breakthrough. Through the (...) concrete and practical movement of human existence, Patočka underscores the existential responsibility that is intrinsic to human subjects. This perspective enables us to confront existential problems and reestablish a sense of purpose and meaning to human existence within the natural world. (shrink)

This article explores Jan Patočka’s notion of “asubjective phenomenology,” which the Czech philosopher elaborated in the mature phase of his thought. More specifically, it proposes to analyze that notion in light of Patočka’s interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, in which he identifies the original, though implicit, possibility of a phenomenology independent of a subjective foundation. In the first part of the paper, the author offers an interpretation of Husserls’ concept of “theory in general” as the original model of the (...) Patočkan phenomenal field, which, just like the logical dimension thematized by Husserl in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, is independent of both objective structures and subjective conditions. It is reasonable to assume that the absence, in Logical Investigations, of “transcendental consciousness,” inspired Patočka in conceiving the manifestation of the object as a thing’s “showing-itself.” This idea is advanced in the second part of the article. Lastly, the final section of the article discusses the concept of “representative” (the sensory content of the intentional act representation) as the second and most significant seed of “asubjective phenomenology” that can be retraced in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. (shrink)