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Guest editor's introduction

Douglas Patterson

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):552 – 558 (2007)

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Inconsistency in natural languages.Jody Azzouni - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3175-3184.details An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber. Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
The Naïve Conception of Properties.Benjamin Schnieder - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):322-342.details The semantic rules that govern ordinary property discourse appear to give rise to a version of Russell's antinomy. Do we therefore have an inconsistent conception of properties? This paper firstly develops a consistent conception of properties and secondly argues that we may indeed interpret ordinary property discourse as expressing the consistent conception rather than an inconsistent one. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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