Recently, new developments took place in the Dutch debate on the legislation of euthanasia. After a brief account of that debate, the article discusses a new government proposal for legislation in this field, which was submitted to the Dutch parliament in November 1991. This proposal relates not only to euthanasia but also to some other medical decisions concerning the end of life. The author concludes that, for several reasons, it is unsatisfactory.

A family had a child in large part to use its marrow in the hopes of saving the life of an older child afflicted with leukaemia. Public response from medical ethicists was negative. This paper argues that what the family did was not clearly wrong and that the ethicists should not have made public pronouncements calling the morals of the family into question.

According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don't-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that they are edicts binding only on some - those who have an end.

The paper develops a Kantian view of the highest good and the relation between virtue and happiness. Several Kantian theses are defended, among them the thesis that the highest good is realized only if every virtuous individual is happy, the view that virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness, and the proposition that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for the worthiness of being happy. The author argues that the highest good ought to be realized and that it ought (...) to be that everyone who is virtuous is happy. To prove these claims, the author will use techniques developed by modern deontic logicians. According to Kant, we do not have an immediate duty to promote our own happiness, the aim of morality being not personal satisfaction but rather virtue and the good will. The important question is not “How do I become happy?” but “How do I become good?”. The arguments in this paper support this view. (shrink)

Las antinomias de la razón ocupan un lugar destacado en el sistema crítico de Kant. El conflicto de la razón consigo misma es lo que despierta al Profesor de Königsberg del “sueño dogmático” y lo conduce a la elaboración del idealismo trascendental. Sin embargo, las antinomias de la razón práctica no han ocupado el mismo lugar que aquellas del uso teórico. De hecho, muchos estudiosos de la obra kantiana consideran que no hay, en sentido estricto, una antinomia de la razón (...) en su uso práctico. El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar que hay una antinomia de la razón práctica. Particularmente, mostremos por qué la antinomia de la razón práctica se debe entender a la luz del concepto kantiano de absurdum practicum. (shrink)

En la tradición ilustrada de Kant y en la tradición aristotélica de Tomás de Aquino encontramos los mismos elementos para explicar la experiencia moral: razón práctica del hombre común, ley moral, voluntad, inclinaciones naturales. Pero la relación de estos elementos entre sí varía radicalmente de una tradición a otra, ya que en la tradición kantiana la razón práctica y la ley moral son completamente heterogéneas respecto a las inclinaciones naturales. En la tradición aristotélica de Tomás de Aquino, en cambio, la (...) razón práctica que conoce la ley moral es parte de la naturaleza del hombre. En la tradición kantiana la ética se encuentra completamente separada de la antropología, y no se conoce a partir de la experiencia. En la tradición aristotélico-tomista, la ética se conoce a partir de la experiencia y su conocimiento es explicable a partir de ella. Both Kant’s Enlightenment tradition and Aquinas’ Aristotelian tradition will usually manage the same elements in order to explain the reality of moral experience, namely: practical reason of the common man, moral law, will, and natural inclinations. Yet the relation existing between these elements certainly varies from one tradition to the other since, within Kantian tradition, practical reason and moral law are completely heterogeneous with regard to natural inclinations. On the contrary, within Aquinas’ Aristotelian tradition, the same practical reason that recognizes the moral law is itself an element of human nature as well. Thus, according to Kantian tradition, ethics are totally detached from anthropology, and they are not grasped out of experience. Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition would state that ethics are grasped through experience and, although they are certainly not derived from anthropology, this later would make the grasping of the former explicable. (shrink)

At the beginning of the third Section of the Groundwork, Kant appears to state the synthetic a priori proposition which it is the business of that Section to justify. It is: “An absolutely good will is one whose maxim can always have as its content itself considered as a universal law.” I shall contend that a consideration of Kant's use of analytic method shows that he is committed to regard this proposition not as synthetic, but rather as analytic. Hence, I (...) shall contend that his statement of the proposition to be justified in the third Section is a slip, which hinders the study of the third Section and which, therefore, requires a textual emendation. Kant, I claim, does not attempt to justify this proposition but another. (shrink)

The topic of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation has been a focus of interest for many years. The purpose of this article is to explore the ethical dimensions of various generally accepted theories of CEO renumeration. We argue that a contractarian approach, based on the Kantian ethical framework, can be used to augment the existing contingent pay models.While the neoclassical economic model of the firm views the maximization of the shareholders'' wealth as the sole responsibility of top management, a contractarian (...) approach regards the balancing of various stakeholders'' interests as the primary task of top management. Ethical problems emerge when there are divergent, yet equally justifiable interests which compete in order to channel organizational resources to meet their own needs. In this situation, given the inherent ambiguities and ever present possibilities of multiple perspectives, it may not always be feasible to provide a categorical answer to the question of whether the CEO''s decisions are ethical. We suggest that a broad interpretation of the neoclassical theory of the firm, one that is grounded in Kantian and contractarian ethics, can serve as a basis for a reconciliation of different theories of executive compensation. (shrink)

Human dignity is one of the key concepts of our ethical evaluations, in politics, in biomedicine, as well as in everyday life. In moral philosophy, however, human dignity is a source of intractable trouble. It has a number of characteristic features which apparently do not fit into one coherent ethical concept. Hence, philosophers tend to ignore or circumvent the concept. There is hope for a philosophically attractive conception of human dignity, however, given that one takes three crucial turns. The negative (...) turn: to start the inquiry with violations of human dignity. The inductive turn: to consider the whole range of applications of the concept of human dignity in different areas of ethics. And finally, the historical turn: to take into account the historical bonds between human dignity and traditional conceptions of dignity. Taken together they point in the direction of an understanding of human dignity as universal nobility. (shrink)

Drawing from four Arendtian themes-plurality, the public realm, power, and perspective appreciation-I argue for citizenship as a "politics of enlarged mentality." This term suggests an alternative conception of citizenship that surpasses the limits of both the liberal and civic republican traditions. Unlike the masculinized liberal ideal of the citizen and contrary to the gendered universality that defines the civic republican traditions, a politics based on enlarged mentality combines context sensitivity with principled judgments.

In business ethics literature, debate over a special ethics generally has framed examination of the rules governing business. By constructing a dilemma faced by proponents of a special ethics, I argue that this framing is misguided. Proponents must adopt either an insular or a derivative conception. The former, the view that business is insulated from moral rules, is problematic because arguments used to support it force proponents to accept the idea that each aspect of life is insulated from moral rules. (...) This idea, however, renders philosophically insignificant the claim that business has a special ethics. Proponents no longer make a claim about business, but, rather, a relativistic claim about ethics in general. The derivative conception is the view that business is a set of circumstances that bear on the application of moral rules. This, however, is true of each aspect of life, and is simply an application of the principle 'ought implies can'. The result is that there is nothing special about this sense of a special ethics. Despite lacking specialness, however, the derivative conception provides proper framing for examination of the rules governing business. It subjects business to moral rules, but, also, accounts for the challenging circumstances businesspersons face. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the suggestion that Kant offers a solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in his Metaphysics of Morals. The problem, briefly, is about how Kant can hold moral evil to be imputable when he also seems to hold that freedom is found only in moral actions. After providing a new formulation of this problem under the title ‘Objection R/S’ and describing the popular strategy for addressing it through reference to this text, the paper recounts (...) some of the history relevant to interpreting the passage in question. The paper then argues that this strategy is not supported by the text and indeed proves to be contrary to other arguments that are central to Kant's moral thought. The closing section briefly considers other possible ways of addressing the Objection R/S. (shrink)

An Old and continuing tendency amongst critics of Kant's thought on ethics has been to maintain that since the categorical imperative merely provides a formal condition for the rightness of actions – that the principle of the action be universalizable without contradiction – it is inadequate as a test for the rightness of actions. Such critics as Hegel, Mill, and recently, R.P. Wolff, have suggested the same fundamental objection to Kant's doctrine: the requirement that a maxim be universalizable is formally (...) compatible with any action whatsoever being right. (shrink)

In the first of the three essays of Theory and Practice published in 1793, Kant took the task to answer some objections that Ch. Garve, Kant’s contemporary popular philosopher, had raised against his ethical theory a couple of years earlier. One of these, the most important one in my view, has to do with the problem of, as Garve puts it, “how anyone can become aware of having performed his duty quite unselfishly”. In this paper, my aim is to recover (...) the pertinence of this text by showing two things. First, that this essay is part of a controversy between Garve and Kant that transcends, historically and philosophically, Theory and Practice itself; and second, that Kant fails to succeed in this controversy against Garve due to a confession that he makes during the discussion, for this statement runs against that which has the intend to be demonstrate by the argument of the “fact of pure reason”. (shrink)