The field of computational law has increasingly moved into the focus of the scientific community, with recent research analysing its issues and risks. In this article, we seek to draw a structured and comprehensive list of societal issues that the deployment of automatically processable regulation could entail. We do this by systematically exploring attributes of the law that are being challenged through its encoding and by taking stock of what issues current projects in this field raise. This article adds to (...) the current literature not only by providing a needed framework to structure arising issues of computational law but also by bridging the gap between theoretical literature and practical implementation. Key findings of this article are: (1) The primary benefit (efficiency vs. accessibility) sought after when encoding law matters with respect to the issues such an endeavor triggers; (2) Specific characteristics of a project—project type, degree of mediation by computers, and potential for divergence of interests—each impact the overall number of societal issues arising from the implementation of automatically processable regulation. (shrink)

. Can the label “law” apply to rules as amoral as the enactments of the Nazis? This question confronted the courts in Germany after 1945. In dealing with it, the judges had to take sides in the philosophical debate over the concept of law. In this context, the prominent voices of the legal philosophers Gustav Radbruch and Hans Kelsen could not go unheard. This paper draws on what could have been the “Radbruch‐Kelsen debate on Nazi Law.” In examining the debate, (...) it will argue for a substantive account of the morality of the law, as expressed in Radbruch's Formula. (shrink)

Many different kinds of professionals work with law, but often they seek to use law for particular governmental or private purposes, they focus on some specific areas or aspects of its creation, interpretation or application, or they study it for its interest judged by criteria that are given by fields of scholarly practice outside it. Is there a special significance for a role exclusively concerned with analysing, protecting and enhancing the general well-being or worth of law as a practical idea? (...) This article argues that such a role is important. Building on Gustav Radbruch's juristic thought, it asks how that role could be elaborated and how a professional responsibility for discharging it might be envisaged. Many professionals concerned with law adopt such a role incidentally or intermittently, but it needs more prominence and clear demarcation. The article suggests that it might be seen as the specialised role of the jurist, treated as a particular kind of legal professional. The term “jurist” would then have not just an honorific connotation. It would indicate a Weberian “pure” type that may approximate some current understandings of “juristic” practice; but it would also identify a normative ideal—something intrinsically valuable. Seen in this way, the jurist is one who assumes a certain unique responsibility for law. (shrink)