Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Risking Belief.John Schwenkler - 2020 - In John Schwenkler & Enoch Lambert (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. Oxford University Press. pp. 196-211.
    This chapter discusses how we should think about experiences that threaten to radically transform our understanding of the world. While it can be rational to treat the “doxastically transformative” potential of an experience as a reason to choose against it, such a decision must be based in something more than the fact that this experience would alter one’s current beliefs. It only in light of knowledge of how things are that a person can choose rationally against transformative processes that would (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Self-control in action and belief.Martina Orlandi & Sarah Stroud - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):225-242.
    Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic Courage is a timely and thought-provoking exploration of the ethics of belief, which shows why epistemology is no mere academic abstraction - the question of what to believe couldn't be more urgent. Jonathan Ichikawa argues that a skeptical, negative bias about belief is connected to a conservative bias that reinforces the status quo.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.
    I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Responding to Skepticism About Doxastic Agency.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):627-645.
    My main aim is to argue that most conceptions of doxastic agency do not respond to the skeptic’s challenge. I begin by considering some reasons for thinking that we are not doxastic agents. I then turn to a discussion of those who try to make sense of doxastic agency by appeal to belief’s reasons-responsive nature. What they end up calling agency is not robust enough to satisfy the challenge posed by the skeptics. To satisfy the skeptic, one needs to make (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations