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The Subjectively Enduring Self

In Ian Phillips (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge. pp. 262-271 (2016)

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  1. Agency and the Successive Structure of Time-Consciousness.Camden Alexander McKenna - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2013-2034.
    I argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing non-successively experiencing agents are not possible for three main reasons, namely that they (1) fail to stand in the right sort of causal relationship (...)
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  • Physical Time Within Human Time.Ronald P. Gruber, Richard A. Block & Carlos Montemayor - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    A possible solution is offered to help resolve the “two times problem” regarding the veridical and illusory nature of time. First it is recognized that the flow of time is part of a wider array of temporal experiences referred to as manifest time, all of which need to be reconciled. Then, an information gathering and utilizing system model is used as a basis for a view of manifest time. The model IGUS robot of Hartle that solves the “unique present” debate (...)
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  • Transformed By Faith.Rebecca Chan - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (1):4-32.
    Appealing to self-interest is a common way of justifying the rationality of religious faith. For instance, Pascal’s wager relies upon the expected value of choosing the life of faith being infinite. Similarly, many contemporary arguments for the rationality of faith turn on whether it is better for an agent to have faith rather than lack it. In this paper, I argue, contra Pascal, that considerations of self-interest do not make choosing faith rational because they fail to take into account the (...)
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  • Empathy for a reason? From understanding agency to phenomenal insight.Celine Boisserie-Lacroix & Marco Inchingolo - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7097-7118.
    The relationship between empathy, understood here as a cognitive act of imaginative transposition, and reasons, has been discussed extensively by Stueber :156–180, 2011; Emot Rev 4:55–63, 2012; in: Maibom The Routledge handbook of philosophy of empathy, Routledge, New York, pp 137–147, 2017). Stueber situates his account of empathy as the reenactment of another person’s perspective within a framework of folk psychology as guided by a principle of rational agency. We argue that this view, which we call agential empathy, is not (...)
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  • Empathy for a reason? From understanding agency to phenomenal insight.Celine Boisserie-Lacroix & Marco Inchingolo - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7097-7118.
    The relationship between empathy, understood here as a cognitive act of imaginative transposition, and reasons, has been discussed extensively by Stueber :156–180, 2011; Emot Rev 4:55–63, 2012; in: Maibom The Routledge handbook of philosophy of empathy, Routledge, New York, pp 137–147, 2017). Stueber situates his account of empathy as the reenactment of another person’s perspective within a framework of folk psychology as guided by a principle of rational agency. We argue that this view, which we call agential empathy, is not (...)
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  • Analytic Phenomenology and the Inseparatism Thesis.Christopher Stratman - 2023 - Argumenta:1-26.
    A phenomenological turn has occurred in contemporary philosophy of mind. Some philosophers working on the nature of intentionality and consciousness have turned away from views that construe the basic ingredients of intentionality in terms of naturalistic tracking relations that hold between thinkers and external conditions in their environment in favor of what has been called the “Phenomenal Intentionality Theory” (PIT). According to PIT, all “original” intentionality is either identical to or partly grounded in phenomenal consciousness. A central claim for PIT (...)
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  • The Structures of Temporally Extended Agents.Luca Ferrero - 2022 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Time in Action: The Temporal Structure of Rational Agency and Practical Thought. pp. 108-132.
    This paper offers an overview of the ways agents might extend over time and the characteristic structure of extended human agency. Agency can extend in two distinct but combinable modes: the ontological, which gives rise to simple continuous agents; and the conceptual, which gives rise to agents who conceive of and care about distal times, and have minimal planning abilities. Our extended form of agency combines both. But we are still limited by the temporal locality in the operation of our (...)
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  • The Limited Phenomenal Infallibility Thesis.Christopher Stratman - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    It may be true that we are epistemically in the dark about various things. Does this fact ground the truth of fallibilism? No. Still, even the most zealous skeptic will probably grant that it is not clear that one can be incognizant of their own occurrent phenomenal conscious mental goings-on. Even so, this does not entail infallibilism. Philosophers who argue that occurrent conscious experiences play an important epistemic role in the justification of introspective knowledge assume that there are occurrent beliefs. (...)
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  • Being Someone Else.Martin Glazier - forthcoming - In Enoch Lambert & John Schwenkler (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. Oxford, UK:
    Could I have been someone other than who I am? Philosophers from Williams to Nagel to Lewis have been tempted to answer 'yes', but how can we make sense of such a view? I argue that to say that it is contingent who I am is to say that it is contingent what perspective I have, in a distinctively metaphysical sense of perspective.
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