En este artículo abordamos los conceptos de «salud» y «enfermedad» tal y como han sido entendidos en el seno de la Logoterapia del psiquiatravienés Viktor Frankl, uno de los métodos psicoterapéuticos más importantes del siglo XX. Esta psicoterapia existencial otorga preeminencia a la dimensión noética o espiritual de la salud, que ha sido, sin embargo, totalmente obviada en el debate naturalismo/normativismo propio de la filosofía de la medicina. Por ello, en este escrito tratamos de mostrar de qué modo las aportaciones (...) teóricas de Viktor Frankl pueden contribuir a la discusión filosófica acerca del estatuto ontológico de la enfermedad, especialmente en el ámbito polémico dela psiquiatría. (shrink)

Current research on second-person relations has often overlooked that this is not a new topic. Addressed mostly under the heading of the “I–thou relation,” second-person relations were discussed by central figures of the phenomenological tradition, including Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, but also quite extensively by much lesser-known authors, such as Karl Löwith, Ludwig Binswanger, and Semyon L. Frank, whose work has been undeservedly neglected in current research. This paper starts off by arguing that, in spite of the rightly acknowledged (...) differences between the Husserlian and the Heideggerian approaches to the investigation of the social world, both approaches converge in the claim that the I–thou relation is founded on more basic forms of sociality. In a second step, against the background of Frank’s and Binswanger’s challenges to that claim, I argue that Löwith’s proposal that the I–thou relation is a primordial form of sociality can be vindicated by conceptualizing I–thou relations as close personal relationships (paradigmatically exemplified by companion friendships and romantic partnerships). After assessing how Löwith’s approach to the I–thou relation stands vis-à-vis Heidegger’s and Husserl’s views, I conclude by suggesting how Löwith’s approach can contribute to current research on second-person relations. (shrink)

Gran parte de los estudios sobre la naturaleza de la cognición social, que también se ha entendido como una perspectiva de se-gunda persona, ha tenido lugar en el marco de la llamada “teoría de la mente”, entendida básicamente como capacidad inferencial de atribución de estados mentales. La fenomenología, por el contrario, advierte la naturaleza corporizada e integrada de la experiencia de sí, lo que permite, consecuentemente, el acceso inmediato a la experiencia vivida del otro. La incorporación de esta comprensión de (...) la cognición social en el ámbito experimental ha planteado un giro interactivo: de perspectivas observacionales y mecanismos individuales a escenarios interactivos y procesos participativos. Este trabajo se propone mostrar tanto el sentido fenomenológico de la cognición social como así también las diversas interpretaciones que han encontrado aplicación en la experimentación neurocientífica en cuanto perspectivas de segunda persona, a fin de evaluar sus aportes y ofrecer posibles tareas aún pendientes.Most of the studies on the nature of social cognition, which has also been understood as second-person perspective, have taken place within the framework of the so-called "theory of mind", basically understood as inferential capacity for attribution of mental states. Phenomenology, on the contrary, shows the embodied and integrated nature of self-experience, which consequently allows immediate access to the lived experience of the other. The incorporation of this understanding of social cognition in the experimental field has proposed an interactive turn: from observational perspectives and individual mechanisms to interactive scenarios and participatory processes. This work aims to show both the phenomenological meaning of social cognition as well as the various interpretations that have found application in neuroscientific experimentation as second-person perspectives, in order to evaluate their contributions and offer possible open tasks. (shrink)