In Bergson and Intensive Magnitude: Dismantling his Critique, Florian Vermeiren argues that Bergson’s critique of intensive magnitude in Time and Free Will is inconsistent with his later philosophy, and even inconsistent with the role of a “difference in degrees of freedom” in Time and Free Will. I argue that it is rather Vermeiren’s analysis which mischaracterizes Bergson’s critique and therefore the interpretation of an inconsistency cannot stand. In the first two sections I reevaluate Bergson’s critique, showing what, according to Bergson, (...) are the good and bad senses of intensity, and how this critique allowed Bergson to institute a new conception of difference as expressed in concrete continuity. In the final section I examine the importance of infinitesimal thought in Bergson’s good sense of intensity. (shrink)

Bergson's integral empiricism is a philosophical approach that aims to harmonize the scientific study of nature with the experience of consciousness. Bergson drew heavily on the basic concepts of calculus in framing his philosophy of intuition. He did not merely use calculus metaphorically to describe processes and organizational patterns of consciousness. Instead, he studied the thought processes actually involved in calculus and showed that they are intimately connected to how we think about change more generally. I propose a distinction between (...) derivative empiricism, i.e., reductionism, and integral empiricism that incorporates the study of the mind by the mind. The method involves the invention of a new kind of knowledge that is not based on generalization or abstraction but rather on the integration of experience. This is predicated on a study of the act of integration in consciousness that underpins our ability to think and do philosophy. (shrink)