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  1. Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Necessity of the Past.Larry Wayne Hohm - 1984 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    There is an ancient puzzle about divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If God has already known that you will do a certain thing tomorrow, then it must already be a settled fact that God has known this. Since knowledge entails truth, it must also be a settled fact that you will do it. In that case, you really cannot avoid doing it. If so, then when you do it tomorrow, you won't do it freely. ;This dissertation consists of a careful (...)
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  • Causing Yesterday’s Effects.Lynne Spellman - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):145 - 161.
    In this paper I wish to examine the claim that it would be possible for us now to do something which would be the posterior efficient cause of some past event. I am not prepared to discuss the physics of elementary particles, and I will not consider what is sometimes called time reversal. Rather my analysis will be limited to cases in which it is alleged that we, in a world of middle-sized physical objects where most causes precede or are (...)
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  • Backwards causation and the permanence of the past.Graham Oddie - 1990 - Synthese 85 (1):71 - 93.
    Can a present or future event bring about a past event? An answer to this question is demanded by many other interesting questions. Can anybody, even a god, do anything about what has already occurred? Should we plan for the past, as well as for the future? Can anybody precognise the future in a way quite different from normal prediction? Do the causal laws and the past jointly preclude free action? Does current physical theory entail a consistent version of backwards (...)
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  • Truth preference and neuter propositions.John King-Farlow - 1963 - Philosophy of Science 30 (1):53-59.
    Tarski's equivalence, as he allows, applies only roughly to assertions in ordinary language. Some of the relevant exceptions are of merely grammatical importance but others leave scope for interesting metaphysical pronouncements on science, mathematics and other fields of assertion. To understand these latter exceptions is to gain insight into Baylis' and Lukasiewicz' views on the question "Are some Propositions neither True nor False?" (this journal, 1936). From different standpoints each is right and each is wrong. This comment also applies to (...)
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