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Mental action

Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741 (2021)

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  1. XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.
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  • Is there a continuum of agentive awareness across physical and mental actions? The case of quasi-movements.Artem S. Yashin, Sergei L. Shishkin & Anatoly N. Vasilyev - 2023 - Consciousness and Cognition 112 (C):103531.
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  • On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought (...)
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  • Sharpening the tools of imagination.Michael T. Stuart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-22.
    Thought experiments, models, diagrams, computer simulations, and metaphors can all be understood as tools of the imagination. While these devices are usually treated separately in philosophy of science, this paper provides a unified account according to which tools of the imagination are epistemically good insofar as they improve scientific imaginings. Improving scientific imagining is characterized in terms of epistemological consequences: more improvement means better consequences. A distinction is then drawn between tools being good in retrospect, at the time, and in (...)
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  • We Are Not All ‘Self‐Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism.Georges Rey - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.
    Shoemaker (1996) presenteda prioriarguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘direct’, but an ‘inference’ of precisely the sort we make about (...)
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  • We Are Not All ‘Self‐Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism.R. E. Y. Georges - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.
    Shoemaker (1996) presenteda prioriarguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘direct’, but an ‘inference’ of precisely the sort we make about (...)
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  • In Defense of Introspective Affordances.David Miguel Gray - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Psychological and philosophical studies have extended J. J. Gibson’s notion of affordances. Affordances are possibilities for bodily action presented to us by the objects of our perception. Recent work has argued that we should extend the actions afforded by perception to mental action. I argue that we can extend the notion of affordance itself. What I call ‘Introspective Affordances’ are possibilities for mental action presented to us by introspectively accessible states. While there are some prima facie worries concerning the non-perceptual (...)
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  • Epistemic Normativity and Cognitive Agency.Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - Noûs 52 (3):508-529.
    On the assumption that genuinely normative demands concern things connected in some way to our agency, i.e. what we exercise in doing things with or for reasons, epistemologists face an important question: are there genuine epistemic norms governing belief, and if so where in the vicinity of belief are we to find the requisite cognitive agency? Extant accounts of cognitive agency tend to focus on belief itself or the event of belief-formation to answer this question, to the exclusion of the (...)
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  • Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.
    Philosophy is witnessing an “Agential Turn,” characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts, and of subjects as their agents. We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency––agentialism about doxastic responsibility, agentialism about doxastic self‐knowledge, and an agentialist explanation of the delusion of thought insertion: agentialists either commit themselves to implausibly strong claims about the kind of agency involved in the relevant phenomena, or make (...)
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  • Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.
    Philosophy is witnessing an “Agential Turn,” characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts, and of subjects as their agents. We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency––agentialism about doxastic responsibility, agentialism about doxastic self‐knowledge, and an agentialist explanation of the delusion of thought insertion: agentialists either commit themselves to implausibly strong claims about the kind of agency involved in the relevant phenomena, or make (...)
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  • Structuring embodied minds: attention and perceptual agency.Jelle Bruineberg & Odysseus Stone - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):461-484.
    Perception is, at least sometimes, something we do. This paper is concerned with how to account for perceptual agency (i.e., the active aspect of perception). Eilan divides accounts of perceptual agency up into two camps: enactivist theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of bodily action, while mental theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of mental action in perception. In Structuring Mind (2017), Sebastian Watzl aligns his ‘activity view’ with the mental (...)
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  • Intelligence Socialism.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    From artistic performances in the visual arts and in music to motor control in gymnastics, from tool use to chess and language, humans excel in a variety of skills. On the plausible assumption that skillful behavior is a visible manifestation of intelligence, a theory of intelligence—whether human or not—should be informed by a theory of skills. More controversial is the question as to whether, in order to theorize about intelligence, we should study certain skills in particular. My target is the (...)
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  • La filosofía política realista de Raymond Geuss: una exposición crítica.Emilio Méndez Pinto - 2023 - Devenires. Revista de Filosofía y Filosofía de la Cultura 47 (47):43-76.
    In this article I discuss the main theses of the realist political philosophy developed in recent years by Raymond Geuss and embodied in his famous Philosophy and Real Politics. Once the motivations behind Geuss’ project identified and its similarities and differences with the other great realistic philosophical-political project of our days, that of Bernard Williams, pointed out, I critically expose Geuss’ theses and his objections to the Kantian and Rawlsian ways of doing political philosophy. In addition to discussing the central (...)
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