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  1. Causal effects and counterfactual conditionals: contrasting Rubin, Lewis and Pearl.Keith A. Markus - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (3):441-461.
    Rubin and Pearl offered approaches to causal effect estimation and Lewis and Pearl offered theories of counterfactual conditionals. Arguments offered by Pearl and his collaborators support a weak form of equivalence such that notation from the rival theory can be re-purposed to express Pearl’s theory in a way that is equivalent to Pearl’s theory expressed in its native notation. Nonetheless, the many fundamental differences between the theories rule out any stronger form of equivalence. A renewed emphasis on comparative research can (...)
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  • Comparing Rubin and Pearl’s causal modelling frameworks: a commentary on Markus (2021).Naftali Weinberger - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):485-493.
    Markus (2021) argues that the causal modelling frameworks of Pearl and Rubin are not ‘strongly equivalent’, in the sense of saying ‘the same thing in different ways’. Here I rebut Markus’ arguments against strong equivalence. The differences between the frameworks are best illuminated not by appeal to their causal semantics, but rather reflect pragmatic modelling choices.
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