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  1. Toward an Ethics of AI Belief.Winnie Ma & Vincent Valton - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (3):1-28.
    In this paper we, an epistemologist and a machine learning scientist, argue that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI – the ethics of belief for AI. Here we take the ethics of belief to refer to a field at the intersection of epistemology and ethics concerned with possible moral, practical, and other non-truth-related dimensions of belief. In this paper we will primarily be concerned with the normative question within the ethics of belief regarding what (...)
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  • Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks.Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Synthese Library. Edited by Gregory Wheeler, Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn & and Jon Williamson.
    Additionally, the text shows how to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework.
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  • An elementary belief function logic.Didier Dubois, Lluis Godo & Henri Prade - 2023 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 33 (3-4):582-605.
    1. There are two distinct lines of research that aim at modelling belief and knowledge: modal logic and uncertainty theories. Modal logic extends classical logic by introducing knowledge or belief...
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  • Probabilistic argumentation.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - Journal of Applied Logic 7 (2):155-176.
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  • The infinite epistemic regress problem has no unique solution.Ronald Meester & Timber Kerkvliet - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):4973-4983.
    In this article we analyze the claim that a probabilistic interpretation of the infinite epistemic regress problem leads to a unique solution, the so called “completion” of the regress. This claim is implicitly based on the assumption that the standard Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory are suitable for describing epistemic probability. This assumption, however, has been challenged in the literature, by various authors. One of the alternatives that have been suggested to replace the Kolmogorov axioms in case of an epistemic (...)
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