The debate about the nature of the representational format of concepts seems to have reached an impasse. The debate faces two fundamental problems. Firstly, amodalists (i.e., those who argue that concepts are represented by amodal symbols) and modalists (i.e., those who see concepts as involving crucially representations including sensorimotor information) claim that the same empirical evidence is compatible with their views. Secondly, there is no shared understanding of what a modal or amodal format amounts to. Both camps recognize that the (...) two formats play essential roles in higher cognition, leading to an increasing number of hybrid proposals. In this paper, I argue that the existence of those fundamental problems should make us suspicious about a modal/amodal dichotomy. Also, I suggest that hybrid approaches, as they currently stand, do not provide suitable solutions to the impasse. Instead, we should overcome the dichotomy and treat the modal/amodal distinction as a graded phenomenon. I illustrate this hypothesis with an example of a cognitive-computational model of concepts based on the Predictive Processing framework. (shrink)

Research on the metaphorical mapping of valenced concepts onto space indicates that positive, neutral, and negative concepts are mapped onto upward, midward, and downward locations, respectively. More recently, this type of research has been tested for the very first time in 3D physical space. The findings corroborate the mapping of valenced concepts onto the vertical space as described above but further show that positive and negative concepts are placed close to and away from the body; neutral concepts are placed midway. (...) The current study aimed at investigating whether valenced perceptual stimuli are positioned onto 3D space akin to the way valenced concepts are positioned. By using a unique device known as the cognition cube, participants placed visual, auditory, tactile and olfactory stimuli on 3D space. The results mimicked the placing of valenced concepts onto 3D space; i.e., positive percepts were placed in upward and close-to-the-body locations and negative percepts were placed in downward and away-from-the-body locations; neutral percepts were placed midway. These pattern of results was more pronounced in the case of visual stimuli, followed by auditory, tactile, and olfactory stimuli. Significance Statement Just recently, a unique device called “the cognition cube” (CC) enabled to find that positive words are mapped onto upward and close-to-the-body locations and negative words are mapped onto downward and away-from-the-body locations; neutral words are placed midway. This way of placing words in relation to the body is consistent with an approach-avoidance effect such that “good” and “bad” things are kept close to and away from one’s body. We demonstrate for the very first time that this same pattern emerges when visual, auditory, tactile, and olfactory perceptual stimuli are placed on 3D physical space. We believe these results are significant in that the CC can be used as a new tool to diagnose emotion-related disorders. (shrink)

We seem to learn and use concepts in a variety of heterogenous “formats”, including exemplars, prototypes, and theories. Different strategies have been proposed to account for this diversity. Hybridists consider instances in different formats to be instances of a single concept. Pluralists think that each instance in a different format is a different concept. Eliminativists deny that the different instances in different formats pertain to a scientifically fruitful kind and recommend eliminating the notion of a “concept” entirely. In recent years, (...) hybridism has received the most attention and support. However, we are still lacking a cognitive-computational model for concept representation and processing that would underpin hybridism. The aim of this paper is to advance the understanding of concepts by grounding hybridism in a neuroscientific model within the Predictive Processing framework. In the suggested view, the different formats are not distinct parts of a concept but arise from different ways of processing a functionally unified representational structure. (shrink)

Our ability to deal with abstract concepts is one of the most intriguing faculties of human cognition. Still, we know little about how such concepts are formed, processed, and represented in mind. Current views are presented in their most recent and advanced form in this special issue, and directly compared and discussed in a lively debate, reported at the end of each chapter. The main results are reported in the editors’ introduction.

concepts are defined as concepts that cannot be experienced directly through the sensorimotor modalities. Explaining our understanding of such concepts poses a challenge to neurocognitive models of knowledge. One account of how these concepts come to be represented is that sensorimotor representations of grounded experiences are reactivated in a way that is constitutive of the abstract concept. In the present experiment, we investigated how sensorimotor information might constitute GOD-related concepts, and whether a person’s self-reported religiosity modulated this grounding. To do (...) so, we manipulated both the state of the body and the state of stimuli in two tasks that required conceptual categorization of abstract words. Linear Mixed Effects model fitting procedures were used to determine which manipulated factors best predicted response latency and accuracy in both tasks. We successfully replicated previous research demonstrating faster categorization of GOD-related words when they were presented at the top of the screen. Importantly, results demonstrated that the kneeling posture manipulation enhanced this effect, as did religiosity, as participants who scored higher in religiosity showed a greater effect of the posture manipulation on the speed with which word categorization occurred when those words were presented in the higher visuospatial presentation condition. Overall, we interpreted our findings to suggest that directly manipulating sensorimotor information can facilitate the categorization of abstract concepts, supporting the notion that this information in part constitutes the representation of abstract concepts. (shrink)