Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Individual Compensatory Duties for Historical Emissions and the Dead-Polluters Objection.Laura García-Portela - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (4):591-609.
    Debates about individual responsibility for climate change revolve mainly around individual mitigation duties. Mitigation duties concern future impacts of climate change. Unfortunately, climate change has already caused important harms and it is foreseeable that it will cause more in the future, in spite of our best efforts. Thus, arguably, individuals might also have duties related to those harms. In this paper, I address the question of whether individuals are obligated to provide compensation for climate related harms that have already occurred. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Focussing on people who experience poverty and on poor-led social movements: the methodology of moral philosophy, collective capabilities, and solidarity.Wouter Peeters - 2023 - Journal of Global Ethics 19 (3):253-262.
    In this commentary, I discuss three aspects of Monique Deveaux’s account. First, the method of Grounded Normative Theorizing she adopts to engage directly with the contexts and views of those experiencing poverty fits within a range of proposals to enhance the methodology of moral and political philosophy, and I would call on all philosophers working in this space to further develop these innovative methodologies. Second, Deveaux extends the capabilities approach by focusing on the group-based character of poverty and making the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Reasoning in the Climate Crisis: A Personal Guide.Arthur R. Obst - forthcoming - Moral Philosophy and Politics.
    This article substantiates the common intuition that it is wrong to contribute to dangerous climate change for no significant reason. To advance this claim, I first propose a basic principle that one has the moral obligation to act in accordance with the weight of moral reasons. I further claim that there are significant moral reasons for individuals not to emit greenhouse gases, as many other climate ethicists have already argued. Then, I assert that there are often no significant moral (or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark