In recent years both philosophers and scientists have asked whether or not our current kinds of mental disorder—e.g., schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder—are natural kinds; and, moreover, whether or not the search for natural kinds of mental disorder is a realistic desideratum for psychiatry. In this dissertation I clarify the sense in which a kind can be said to be “natural” or “real” and argue that, despite a few notable exceptions, kinds of mental disorder cannot be considered natural kinds. Furthermore, I (...) contend that psychopathological phenomena do not cluster together into kinds in the way that paradigmatic natural kinds (e.g., chemical kinds and species) do; and, in light of this fact, I conclude that the normative ideal of natural classification—i.e. classifying real or natural kinds—is not appropriate as a general strategy for psychiatry. In the conclusion to this dissertation I propose an alternative way forward. Rather than assuming a priori that psychopathological phenomena cluster together into kinds, a more tractable and theoretically promising approach would be to first explain how particular kinds of experiences and behaviours—e.g, hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thinking, mania, low mood, etc.—are produced. (shrink)

In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York (Barlow, 2017). Under animal welfare laws, Tommy’s owners, the Laverys, were doing nothing illegal by keeping him in those conditions. Nonetheless, the NhRP argued that given the cognitive, social, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees, Tommy’s confinement constituted (...) a profound wrong that demanded remedy by the courts. Soon thereafter, the NhRP filed habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Kiko, another chimpanzee housed alone in Niagara Falls, and Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees held in research facilities at Stony Brook University. Thus began the legal struggle to move these chimpanzees from captivity to a sanctuary, an effort that has led the NhRP to argue in multiple courts before multiple judges. The central point of contention has been whether Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo have legal rights. To date, no judge has been willing to issue a writ of habeas corpus on their behalf. Such a ruling would mean that these chimpanzees have rights that confinement might violate. Instead, the judges have argued that chimpanzees cannot be bearers of legal rights because they are not, and cannot be persons. In this book we argue that chimpanzees are persons because they are autonomous. (shrink)

This dissertation is a collection of essays exploring the role of metaphor in Aristotle’s scientific method. Aristotle often appeals to metaphors in his scientific practice; but in the Posterior Analytics, he suggests that their use is inimical to science. Why, then, does he use them in natural science? And what does his use of metaphor in science reveal about the nature of his scientific investigations? I approach these questions by investigating the epistemic status of metaphor in Aristotelian science. In the (...) first essay, I defend an interpretation of metaphor as a type of heuristic reasoning: I claim that Aristotle uses metaphor to express conditions an explanation in natural science must meet if it is to explain regular, ordered change. These conditions specify the kinds of causes—particularly unmoved efficient causes—which the inquirer into nature is seeking. In the second essay, I look to Aristotle’s use of certain endoxa or common beliefs as explanatory principles in science, and show that his use of these principles is similar to his use of metaphor. In the final essay, I present a historical study of the analogy of art and nature, and I suggest that by looking to how the Greeks understood the role of inquiry in the arts, we can shed some light on Aristotle’s views concerning the method of inquiry he thinks the natural scientist should adopt. (shrink)

During the Middle Ages Aristotle's treatises were accessible to intellectuals via translations and commentaries. Among his works on natural philosophy, the zoological books received relatively little scholarly attention, though several medieval commentators carefully studied Aristotle's investigations of the animal kingdom. Averroes completed in 1169 a commentary on an Arabic translation of Aristotle's Parts of Animals and Generation of Animals. In 1323 Gersonides completed his supercommentary on a Hebrew translation of Averroes' commentary. This article examines how these two medieval commentators interpret (...) the first book of Aristotle's Parts of Animals, at the center of which stand methodological questions regarding the study of animals. Aristotle's discussion of classification is presented by Averroes and Gersonides in light of an epistemological debate concerning the requisite method for scientific inquiries and discoveries. Sense perception is contrasted with rational reasoning, and ultimately a combined method is proposed, sense perception maintaining supremacy. These commentators outline a clear link between the systematic arrangement of animal species as offered by Aristotle, and his subsequent logical demonstrations which, according to them, form the core of biological investigations. (shrink)

During the Middle Ages Aristotle’s treatises were accessible to intellectuals via translations and commentaries. Among his works on natural philosophy, the zoological books received relatively little scholarly attention, though several medieval commentators carefully studied Aristotle’s investigations of the animal kingdom. Averroes completed in 1169 a commentary on an Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Parts of Animals and Generation of Animals. In 1323 Gersonides completed his supercommentary on a Hebrew translation of Averroes’ commentary. This article examines how these two medieval commentators interpret (...) the first book of Aristotle’s Parts of Animals, at the center of which stand methodological questions regarding the study of animals. Aristotle’s discussion of classification is presented by Averroes and Gersonides in light of an epistemological debate concerning the requisite method for scientific inquiries and discoveries. Sense perception is contrasted with rational reasoning, and ultimately a combined method is proposed, sense perception maintaining supremacy. These commentators outline a clear link between the systematic arrangement of animal species as offered by Aristotle, and his subsequent logical demonstrations which, according to them, form the core of biological investigations. (shrink)

Species are central to biology, but there is currently no agreement on what the adequate species concept should be, and many have adopted a pluralist stance: different species concepts will be required for different purposes. This thesis is a multidimensional analysis of species pluralism. First I explicate how pluralism differs monism and relativism. I then consider the history of species pluralism. I argue that we must re-frame the species problem, and that re-evaluating Aristotle's role in the histories of systematics can (...) shed light on pluralism. Next I consider different forms of pluralism: evolutionary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism, which differ in their stance on evolutionary theory. I show that pluralism is more than a debate about the species category, but a debate about which concepts are legitimate and a claim about how they interact with one another. Following that, I consider what sort of ontology is required for different forms of species pluralism. I argue that pluralists who deny the unity of biology will require a further plurality of frameworks, while those that ground their pluralism in evolution need only one framework. Finally, I consider what pluralism means for biological practice. I argue that species concepts are tools, and reflect on how pluralism can illuminate the way systematists approach the discovery of new species of yeast. Pluralism can make sense of the way species concepts are used, and can be developed to aid researchers in thinking about how to use the right tools for the right jobs. (shrink)

Within the critical humanities there has been a recent return to Marxist and communist thought, which has meant a reckoning with post-structuralism. Thinkers, such as José Muñoz and Jodi Dean, who have been critical of parts of the post-structural legacy, have also held onto certain aspects of that tradition, in particular non-coincidence as a stay against identity, administration, and/or determination. However, they have done so in ways that have left unquestioned a contemporary commonsense around teleology. In this essay I argue (...) this has led to an inability to think or maintain connections between the subject and representation – crucial categories for any materialism. Through a discussion of the work of Cuban poet José Lezama Lima, I cultivate a critical vocabulary for building and sustaining non-coincident relations between the subject and representation, ones which neither collapse these two planes nor render them abyssal. (shrink)

Species pluralism allows for multiple species concepts. Given the overwhelming number of such concepts, this seems like an obvious interpretation of how `species' is used in contemporary biology. But why has it taken so long for this approach to be considered? I argue that part of the reason pluralism was overlooked due to the widespread use of a particular rhetorical strategy developed by Ernst Mayr. This strategy provided a framework for debates about the correct conception of species. That is, the (...) strategy offered a means of comparing modern concepts with a monistic-essentialist understanding of species. I ask what would happen if we replaced this concept with Aristotle's own pluralist-essentialist understanding of species. As recent scholarship shows, Aristotle's philosophy of biology allows for an approach to classification that is in practice highly pluralistic. From this new framework we can understand what sort of assumptions are at stake between modern forms of species pluralism. My analysis shows that the essentialist story told by Mayr and others left us asking the wrong questions about how to conceive of species in an evolutionary world. Having a deeper understanding of Aristotle's approach to the classification of animals allows us to shift focus from the so-called species problem in order to raise four issues that are relevant to current debates. These are questions about: the explanatory power of taxonomic ranks, the importance of the species category problem, whether species are constituted by intrinsic or extrinsic properties, and how to interpret the ``cross-cutting'' metaphor endemic to the pluralist literature. In order to get to these questions I will first explain what sort of claim species pluralism is at the most general level, and a gloss on the standard interpretation of the historical shift from species monism to species pluralism. (shrink)