This paper argues that Hegel's depiction of knowledge, as presented in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective Spirit, is founded on what he deems to be the practical interests of self-consciousness. More specifically, it highlights the significance of the will in Hegel's understanding of the cognitive process. I begin with a survey of the relation between category-formation and the notion of self-determining freedom in the Logic , and therewith draw attention to the unity of thinking and willing in the Concept. I (...) then indicate how Hegel's philosophy of subjective Spirit should be read as the applied logic of the Concept, according to which the socially constituted self-conscious I seeks to realise its claims to freedom through its theoretical cognitions of objects. As part of what could be called Hegel's integrative theory of the faculties, I finally argue that the will underscores both the determinate character of our theoretical cognitions and the reflexivity of knowledge in general. On this score, I maintain that Hegel, whose relation to Kant and Fichte I also consider, is of the view that it is with reference to willing that we can account for the self-referential nature of reason in toto as the actualised unity of theoretical-practical subjectivity. (shrink)

Patriotism is not commonly associated with freedom. Even less so when Hegel is evoked. By reading Hegel’s concept of patriotism through the lens of revolutionary France, I present a notion of patriotism that is tied to the realization of freedom. This paper demonstrates what happens when Hegel’s philosophy of law is re-read through the political philosophy of the French Revolution itself. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and its lectures are marked by tensions. The legacy it leaves traces it leaves behind can (...) be re-appropriated to explore the inconclusive hints left by the philosopher. The idea of patriotism is one of them, simply defined as an intersubjective link between the concrete individual and the state or as particular and general interests coinciding. This paper expands this analysis by introducing two elements: Hegel’s discussion on the character of the law and how it comes to be law; and the revolutionary phenomenon itself. The revolutionaries’ views on patriotism and its functions within a revolutionary moment can help us transform the mere traces left by Hegel into a wider vision that incorporates and promotes freedom. (shrink)

_Critical essays on Hegel's views concerning the relationship between religion and politics._.

U članku se ističe uloga vlasništva u uspostavljanju slobodne volje. Ljudska sloboda obično se shvaća kao sposobnost pojedinca za proizvoljno donošenje odluka. Iako se čini da se radi o svjesnim akcijama, akcijama u kojima smo najbliže sebi, ipak nismo svjesni uzroka kojim se utvrđuju ove akcije. Ipak, umjesto da izgladimo vrijednosnu podjelu između slobode i nužnosti, naš je cilj objasniti kako je logika slobode imanentno vezana za nužnost izlaska izvan sebe. Hegel nije prvi koji je pokazao tu logiku, ali bio (...) je najdosljedniji u iznošenju ideje slobode kao postajanje drugim. Za njega, biti slobodnom osobom, subjektom, znači eksternalizirati našu volju u neovisne vanjske stvari i time steći vlasništvo nad njima. Sloboda, dakle, nije individualna kvaliteta, već društveni princip, jer vlasnička prava mogu postojati samo u intersubjektivnim odnosima. U tom kontekstu, postavlja se pitanje: kako je u okolnostima gdje je subjektivnost proizvod vlasništva i dalje moguće stvoriti nešto iz ničega? The article highlights the role of property in the establishment of free will. Human freedom is usually understood as individual’s capacity for arbitrary decision- making. While it seems that we are dealing with conscious actions, actions where we are closest to ourselves, we nonetheless remain unaware of the causes whereby these actions are determined. But instead of reconciling the age old divide between freedom and necessity, our aim is to expound how the logic of freedom is immanently bound to the necessity to go outside oneself. Hegel was not the first to demonstrate this logic, but was the most consistent in laying out the idea of freedom as self-othering. For him, being a free person, subject, means to externalize our will into a non-independent extraneous things and thereby obtain ownership over them. Freedom is therefore not an individual quality, but a societal principle as property rights can only exist in intersubjective relationships. In this context, the following question comes to the fore: how is in circumstances where subjectivity is a product of ownership still possible to create something out of nothing? (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the conceptual foundations of sovereignty in Hegel’s Philosophy of Law in order to provide an answer to this question and thus be able to evaluate the scope of contemporary sovereignty and the adequacy of its claims. As will be seen, Hegel constructs his own position in critical dialogue with Hobbes’ and Kant’s approaches, with more or less explicit references. The development of this article is divided into three parts. In the first, the Hegelian conception of (...) sovereignty is presented in the framework of his organicist understanding of the state, taking into account both its internal and external aspects. The second, analyses Hegel’s theoretical foundations of war and his position in international relations. Finally, the scope of sovereignty today is discussed in the light of Hegelian thought. (shrink)

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel insists that a marriage is only established after a wedding ceremony has taken place but he provides no satisfactory justification for thinking this. In this paper, I attempt to provide some justifications for him. I advocate an interpretation of Hegel that (1) understands the declaration of consent uttered in the wedding ceremony to be a performative act whose force is what transforms a relationship into a marriage and that (2) understands Hegel’s general concept of (...) personality to inform his requirement that the agreement to marry be declared publicly. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper I will provide a reading of the relation between nature and spirit starting from an analysis of the movement of positing and presupposing, discussed by Hegel in the "Science of Logic" in his discussion of the transition between Being and Essence. 1) I will offer an analysis of the logical context within which this dialectical movement emerges. 2) I will show the role played by this dialectical movement in determining the relation between the spheres of nature (...) and spirit in Hegelʼs "Encyclopedia". 3) I will then claim that a difficulty related to this movement arises in the "Logic", and that this difficulty reverberates in the relation between nature and spirit in Hegel's system. In particular, 4) an ambiguity arising at a logical level generates two different configurations of this movement, depending on whether the latter is meant to describe the relation of 4.1) the finite or of 4.2) the infinite spirit to nature. 5) I will finally focus on some problems deriving from my reconstruction and I will try to suggest - in very general and programmatic terms - in what sense the internal analysis of the relation between nature and spirit in Hegelʼs system can be fruitfully discussed against the dominant framework of the contemporary debate, i.e. naturalism. However, this suggestion does not necessarily imply an endorsement of Hegel's position. RESUMO Neste artigo, proponho-me a fornecer uma leitura da relação entre natureza e espírito a partir de uma análise do movimento de pôr e pressupor descrito por Hegel na "Ciência da Lógica", na passagem do Ser à Essência. 1) Analisarei o contexto lógico dentro do qual surge o movimento de pôr e pressupor. 2) Mostrarei o papel deste movimento dialético na determinação da relação entre as esferas da natureza e do espírito na "Enciclopédia" de Hegel. 3) Destacarei uma dificuldade que emerge na "Lógica" e mostrarei como esta dificuldade tem repercussões sobre a relação entre natureza e espírito no sistema de Hegel. Em particular, 4) uma ambiguidade que emerge no nível lógico gera duas diferentes configurações deste movimento, dependendo de se ele descreve 4.1) a relação do espírito finito ou 4.2) a relação do espírito infinito com a natureza. 5) Na última parte, mostrarei alguns problemas que derivam de minha reconstrução e tentarei sugerir - em termos gerais e programáticos - em que sentido uma análise interna da relação entre natureza e espírito em Hegel pode ser proficuamente discutida com respeito ao paradigma dominante do debate contemporâneo, isto é, o naturalismo. (shrink)

Gender greatly impacts access to opportunities, potential, and success in corporate leadership roles. We begin with a general presentation of why such discussion is necessary for basic considerations of justice and fairness in gender equality and how the issues we raise must impact any ethical perspective on gender in the corporate workplace. We continue with a breakdown of the central categories affecting the success of women in corporate leadership roles. The first of these includes gender-influenced behavioral factors, such as the (...) requirements and expectations of gendered verbal and nonverbal communication styles as well as appearance. We move on to address the impact of family on corporate leadership opportunities and success, discussing the asymmetrical evaluation of an individual’s potential, authority, and competence based on gender stereotypes of familial obligations and expectations. Finally, we address how gender impacts access to networking and sponsorship opportunities and the long-term effects of systematic limitations on women’s inclusion in the upper echelons of corporate leadership. We conclude with a summary of the questions and issues raised by our discussion and direct individuals to consider how different ethical systems and moral requirements might influence their interpretations of gender and leadership in the corporate workplace. (shrink)