We evaluate the richness of the child’s input in semantics and its relation to the hypothesis space available to the child. Our case study is the acquisition of the universal quantifier every. We report two main findings regarding the acquisition of every on the basis of a corpus study of child-directed and child-ambient speech. Our first finding is that the input in semantics is rich enough to systematically eliminate instances of the subset problem of language acquisition: overly general hypotheses about (...) the meaning of every can violate pragmatic constraints, making such hypotheses incompatible with the child’s input. Our second finding is that the semantic input is too poor to eliminate instances of what we refer to as the superset problem, the mirror image of the subset problem. We argue that at least some overly specific hypotheses about the meaning of every are compatible with the child’s input, suggesting either that those hypotheses are not made available by UG or that non-trivial inductive biases are involved in children’s acquisition of every. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that noun complement modality cannot be treated as dependent on the meanings of lexical embedding predicates or of abstract performatives. Using two types of complement modalities, I show that their meanings and restrictions remain distinct and invariable regardless of the meanings of their embedding predicates. Then, using embedding predicates that can take both types of modalities, I show that the embedding predicates retain their meanings, regardless of the different modalities of their complements, and they can (...) undergo deletions requiring their identity. (shrink)

Like proper names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions, pronouns have referential uses. These can be 'essentially indexical' in the sense that they cannot be replaced by non-pronominal forms of reference. Here we show that the grammar of pronouns in such occurrences is systematically different from that of other referential expressions, in a way that illuminates the differences in reference in question. We specifically illustrate, in the domain of Romance clitics and pronouns, a hierarchy of referentiality, as related to the topology of (...) the grammatical phase. Our explanation is based on extending the 'Topological Mapping Hypotheses' of Longobardi and Sheehan & Hinzen. The extended topology covers the full range of interpretations, from purely predicative to quantificational, to referential and deictic. Along this scale, grammatical complexity increases, and none of these forms of reference is lexical. This provides evidence for the foundational conclusion that the source of essential indexicality is grammatical rather than lexical, semantic or pragmatic. (shrink)

The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology and imported into the philosophy of science in order to provide representations of scientific concepts and conceptual taxonomies. The aim of this article is to show that beside the representation of scientific concepts the frame model is an efficient instrument to represent and analyze scientific theories. That is, we aim to establish the frame model as a representation tool for the structure of theories within the philosophy of science. For this, we will (...) develop the notion of a theory frame and distinguish between theory frames for qualitative theories in which scientific measurement is based on nominal scales and theory frames for quantitative theories in which measurement is based on ratio scales. In three case studies, we will apply frames to a psychological, a linguistic, and a physical theory, thereby showing that the frame model is a powerful and intuitively accessible instrument to analyze the laws of scientific theories, the determination of theoretical concepts, the explanatory role of theoretical concepts, the abductive introduction of a new theoretical concept, the distinction between the core and the periphery of a theory, the diachronic development of a theory, and the distinction between qualitative and quantitative scientific concepts. Finally, we will provide a comparison to the structuralist view of theories, one of the most elaborated and applied models of theory representation. (shrink)

According to a seminal paper by Barsalou , frames are attribute-value-matrices for representing exemplars or concepts. Frames have been used as a tool for reconstructing scientific concepts as well as conceptual change within scientific revolutions . In the frame-based representations of scientific concepts developed so far the semantic content of concepts is determined by a set of attribute-specific values. This way of representing semantic content works best for prototype concepts and defined concepts of a conceptual taxonomy satisfying the no-overlap principle. (...) In addition to the semantic content of prototype concepts and defined concepts, frames can also contain empirical knowledge that is represented as constraints between the values of the frame. Beside prototype concepts and defined concepts, theoretical concepts that are multiply operationalized play an important role in science. However, so far no frame-based representation of theoretical concepts has been proposed. In this paper, it will be shown that theoretical concepts can be represented by frames and that frame-based representations of prototype concepts and defined concepts have another structure than frame-based representations of theoretical concepts. In order to explicate this difference, we will develop a frame-based method for representing all three kinds of concepts by means of mathematical graph-theory. One important consequence will be that the constraints of a frame representing a theoretical concept are entailed by the structure of the frame, as opposed to a frame representing defined or prototype concepts. (shrink)

Crosslinguistically, the same modal words can be used to express a wide range of interpretations. This crosslinguistic trend supports a Kratzerian analysis, where each modal has a core lexical entry and where the difference between an epistemic and a root interpretation is contextually determined. A long-standing problem for such a unified account is the equally robust crosslinguistic correlation between a modal’s interpretation and its syntactic behavior: epistemics scope high (in particular higher than tense and aspect) and roots low, a fact (...) which has led to proposals that hardwire different syntactic positions for epistemics and roots (cf. Cinque’s hierarchy). This paper argues that the range of interpretations a modal receives is even more restricted: a modal must be keyed to certain time-individual pairs, but not others. I show that this can be captured straightforwardly by minimally modifying the Kratzerian account: modals are relative to an event—rather than a world—of evaluation, which readily provides a time (the event’s running time) and (an) individual(s) (the event’s participants). I propose that this event relativity of modals can in turn explain the correlation between type of interpretation and syntactic position, without stipulation of an interpretation-specific height for modals. (shrink)

There is a set of Spanish verbs which admit both Indicative and Subjunctive complements. The Indicative complementizer is correlated with a positive presupposition about the truth of the complement; the Subjunctive implies a neutral attitude. This paper shows that these presuppositions must be reflected in the underlying structure of the complement and cannot be explained through the use of surface structure interpretation rules because the presuppositional nature of the subordinate clause affects the application of a number of transformations, even very (...) early ones. Indicative and Subjunctive restrictive relative clauses imply the same types of presuppositions as the Indicative and Subjunctive complements respectively. They can be explained through the same type of configurations which can account for the syntactic and semantic behavior of the two types of complements. (shrink)

Aleut shows a remarkable alternation in its case and agreement patterns: roughly put, one pattern appears when a non-subject argument is syntactically unexpressed in a predicate, and the other pattern appears otherwise. This paper is devoted to an attempt to provide a coherent analysis for this alternation: the missing argument is analyzed as a pro which must move into a local relation with the highest T; in this position, it triggers additional agreement on the verb, and blocks normal case assignment (...) to the subject (which then gets a different case). This movement is analogous to that of (potentially long) clitic movement, and its effects on the case and agreement patterns is shown to be similar to the wh-agreement pattern in Chamorro. (shrink)

In this paper I want to look at what the evidence from Complex Predicates can tell us about the design parameters of an empirically adequate theory of Universal Grammar (UG). This is a fertile field for investigation because, according to the standard assumptions of the field, complex predicates are monoclausal with respect to some properties and multiclausal with respect to others and this tension can only be resolved by giving up some cherished beliefs. After introducing the problem in Section 1, (...) Sections 2–4 will lay out the basis of the dilemma. Sections 2 and 3 argue that Romance complex predicates have an articulated rightwardbranching phrase structure, and cannot be analyzed as some sort of verb compound or verbal complex while conversely Section 4 shows how in many respects a complex predicate does behave just like a single predicate. Hence we require a notion of monoclausality that these complex predicates satisfy despite their articulated phrase structure. (shrink)