The article deals with an interpretation of the work of Ch. Perelman. The author tries to determine the meaning of reasonableness in a hermeneutical and anthropological perspective. He then places the work of Perelman in the light of the theory of symbolic interactionism of G.H. Mead.

.The article deals with the difference between some forms of legal positivism. It is argued that, even in continental legal systems which are typically “rule bound,” there is some space left for principles in the legal system. The author tries to explain how this space can be filled and what methods should be used by a judge to do so.

This article provides a basic general introduction to Ramus, and evaluates his role in the history of logic and rhetoric, especially with relation to the study of argumentation. The author agrees with Ong and other historians of logic that Ramus is not to be taken seriously as a logician, and that his undoubted importance in the history of ideas is to be found elsewhere.Ramus advocates a belief in nature, experience and reason, and rejects the reliance on the authority of ancient (...) philosophers, above all Aristotle, though ‘experience’ does not mean scientific experiment and, paradoxically, includes the example of great philosophers and writers. In the end Ramus is seen as responsible for substituting for ancient classical rhetoric an entirely ornamental rhetoric of figures which was to take over education (with the exception of the Jesuit schools) almost until our own day. This curtailing and diminishing of rhetoric is seen as a degeneration. Ancient five-part rhetoric had been concerned with convincing and persuading: Aristotle distinguished the analytic, scientific reasoning of logic, from dialectic which was based on opinion and probability and had close links with rhetoric; by the time of Cicero and Quintilian, who addressed themselves to jurists and politicians, logic has given way to dialectic. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the two become assimilated; the evolution of this is traced here through the thirteenth-century Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain to the fifteenth-century German humanist logician Rudolph Agricola, who influenced Ramus partly through the intermediary of Johann Sturm. Ramus took over their topical theories but restricted them to logic/dialectic, and left rhetoric with little more than tropes and figures. He believed that there was only one method for teaching all the arts, and one dialectic common to them all. The distinction between analytical and dialectical has disappeared, with far-reaching consequences for the study of argumentation. Over the centuries logic has lost its connection with controversy and persuasion. With the development of the post-Cartesian, post-Baconian emphasis on the clarity of scientific discourse, and the mid-nineteenth-century interest in mathematical and formal logic, the process was complete. Argumentation, or the ‘new rhetoric’, aims to fill the gap thus created. (shrink)

La question posée est celle des interfaces entre le système juridique et la société. Le contexte social du droit n’est pas pris ici comme surdéterminant, le droit se développant de manière autoréférentielle, dans une mesure, certes limitée, limites qu’il convient précisément d’analyser. Il y a entre le système social et le système juridique une circulation constante d’informations, qui passent par ce que nous appelons les figures juridiques. Celles-ci—le législateur, le juge ou le sujet de droit—sont en situation de choisir dans (...) le contexte social ce qu’elles décident d’y prendre pour lui donner statut de norme. En cela, la figure juridique fait acte politique: elle ne prend pas le contexte auquel elle fait face comme un donné «naturel» qui s’imposerait à elle univoquement, mais elle choisit dans la complexité de ce contexte ce qui lui semble correspondre à l’univers juridique auquel elle appartient. Cela est possible de par sa position même dans chacun des deux univers—c’est sa véritable situation—d’un côté comme fonction juridique et de l’autre, mais en même temps, comme acteur social: elle a à dire ce qui peut passer de l’un à l’autre, elle ne répète pas ce que l’un ou l’autre dit; elle se trouve en situation parce qu’elle est le lieu de passage entre deux mondes non concomitants dans leur existence propre, mais entre lesquels elle a à faire correspondre un discours qui donne et prenne sens. (shrink)

La notion d’arbitraire s’est imposée en théorie du droit—où il est question des moyens d’éviter l’arbitraire du juge ou du souverain—et en sémiotique, où la thèse de l’arbitraire du signe est associée à Saussure, un des pères de la “sémiologie”. Pourtant, aucune définition positive n’existe de l’arbitraire, ou du moins aucune ne s’est encore valablement imposée. Le présent article se propose de trouver les raisons pour lesquelles un concept si présent dans la théorie pâtit d’un tel manquement.

We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of (...) one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and philosophers of the argumentation fields, such as G. Cornu, E. Feteris, A. Garapon, J. J. Robrieux, C. Perelman, C. M. Stamakis, among others, had already emphasized: judges are not cold machines in the moments of a judging. The analysis may show that a sentence is a mix of legal rules and magistrates’ personal experience, in some extent. (shrink)