This research documents consumers’ potential to monitor corporations’ License to Operate through their consumption responses to corporate social responsibility failures. The premise is that the type of social contracts or standards in place may determine how consumers, through their individual and collective behaviors, can play a direct role in influencing corporate behavior, when corporations fail to meet social responsibility standards. An experiment conducted with a large sample of consumers in the United States shows that consumers respond differently to a company’s (...) failure in its social responsibilities depending on whether the violated standard is a government mandate or a voluntary commitment and depending on the consumers’ own environmental consciousness. The findings highlight the potential power of individual consumers and consumer collectives in narrowing the governance gaps relative to social and environmental issues and reducing the likelihood of CSR failures. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a relatively undeveloped concept despite its increasing importance to corporations. One difficulty is the possible inexactness of CSR. Another is the apparent reluctance by regulatory authorities and policy makers to intervene in the area. This is largely a result of inhibitions created by traditional approaches to company law with emphasis on shareholder protection and financial disclosure. The consequence is the stultification of independent development of CSR by tying social issues to financial performance. This attitude might (...) not be unconnected to the theoretical and practical challenges in justifying CSR and defining its scope. The underlying impediment is a factual and theoretical failure to distinguish ‘instrumental’ and ‘pure’ (ethical) CSR. This article demonstrates that ethical CSR highlights the role of regulation, and a principal stance is that regulation is neither incompatible nor irreconcilable with ethical CSR. The article argues that cognizance of the intrinsic moral justification of ‘pure’ CSR is required for delineating the scope of CSR as well as for clarifying the desirability and extent of its regulation. It argues that the dynamic history and visage of multinational corporate corruption illuminates the fluidity of the regulation–CSR relationship. The current and widening backlash against transnational corporate corruption is, arguably, a demonstration of the position that regulation and CSR are not mutually exclusive and absolute concepts. This article submits that recognition and application of this ‘ethical’ and ‘instrumental’ CSR distinction is fundamental to the development of CSR and resolution of connected questions of regulation. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of vulnerability in the basis of business ethics by criticizing its role in giving a moral substantial character to fiduciary duties to shareholders. The target is Marcoux’s (Bus Ethics Q 13(1):1–24, 2003) argument for morally substantial fiduciary duties vis-à-vis the multifiduciary stakeholder theory. Rather than proceed to support the stakeholder paradigm, a conception of vulnerability is combined with Heath’s 2004) “market failure” view of the ethical obligations of managers as falling out of their roles as (...) professionals involved in the institution of the market. The result is the core of a theoretically defensible and managerially motivating and deployable ethic. (shrink)