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  1. Reasons Internalism, Cooperation, and Law.Olof Leffler - 2020 - In Rachael Mellin, Raimo Tuomela & Miguel Garcia-Godinez (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 115-132.
    Argues that reasons internalism, suitably understood, explains categorical reasons for us to cooperate with each other. The norms we then cooperate to satisfy can lie at the heart of legal systems, yielding unexpected implications in the philosophy of law.
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  • A Kantian Reading of 'Good' and 'Good For'. Some Reflections on Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen's Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value.Herlinde Pauer-Studer - 2023 - Value,Morality and Social Reality.
    The paper argues that Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s fitting-attitude analysis of ‘good’ and ‘good for’ allows us to interpret and justify Kant’s Formula of Humanity (FH) in a constructive way. His classification of ‘good’ as a non-relational intrinsic final value and ‘good for’ as a relational extrinsic final value sheds light on two main features of FH, namely that it requires us to display a specific attitude to human beings, while also obligating us to recognize this value in the relational dimension. Based (...)
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  • The Intransparency of Political Legitimacy.Matthias Brinkmann - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.
    Some moral value is transparent just in case an agent with average mental capacities can feasibly come to know whether some entity does, or does not, possess that value. In this paper, I consider whether legitimacy—that is, the property of exercises of political power to be permissible—is transparent. Implicit in much theorising about legitimacy is the idea that it is. I will offer two counter-arguments. First, injustice can defeat legitimacy, and injustice can be intransparent. Second, legitimacy can play a critical (...)
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  • Normative Facts as Reasons.Yohan Molina - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):342-347.
    In ‘Normative Facts and Reasons’, Fabienne Peter proposes that there are two different types of practical warrant, which she terms ‘entitlement warrant’ and ‘reason-based justification’. This thesis relies fundamentally on her distinction between normative facts and normative reasons. I will raise two general critical observations. First, I will claim that Peter advocates a representation-dependent conception of reasons that is at odds with an intuitive and accepted understanding of them. Second, I will contend that reasons need not be the entities we (...)
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  • Perceptual presentation and the Myth of the Given.Alfonso Anaya - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7453-7476.
    This paper articulates and argues for the plausibility of the Presentation View of Perceptual Knowledge, an under-discussed epistemology of perception. On this view, a central epistemological role of perception is that of making subjects aware of their surroundings. By doing so, perception affords subjects with reasons for world-directed judgments. Moreover, the very perceived concrete entities are identified as those reasons. The former claim means that the position is a reasons-based epistemology; the latter means that it endorses a radically anti-psychologist conception (...)
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  • Varieties of Normativity: Reasons, Expectations, Wide-scope oughts, and Ought-to-be’s.Arto Laitinen - 2020 - In Rachael Mellin, Raimo Tuomela & Miguel Garcia-Godinez (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 133-158.
    This chapter distinguishes between several senses of “normativity”. For example, that we ought to abstain from causing unnecessary suffering is a normative, not descriptive, claim. And so is the claim that we have good reason, and ought to drive on the right, or left, side of the road because the law requires us to do that. Reasons and oughts are normative, by definition. Indeed, it may be that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, (...)
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