Apresentaçáo da traduçáo do artigo der Peter Lipton: "Is the Best Good Enough?" (publicado em 1993 no Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. XCIII, parte 2, pp. 89-104).

Charles S. Peirce luokitteli 1865 päättelyn lajit deduktioon, induktioon ja hypoteesiin, joista viimeksi mainittua hän luonnehti päättelynä vaikutuksista syihin tai päättelynä selitykseen. Hypoteesi on Peircelle induktion ohella tietoa laajentava päätelmä. 1890-luvun lopun kirjoituksissaan hän alkoi kutsua hypoteettista päättelyä uusilla nimillä ”retroduktio” ja ”abduktio”. Tässä vaiheessa Peirce kuvasi abduktiota tieteellisen päättelyn ensimmäisenä askeleena, mahdollisten arvausten esittämisenä, jonka tulokset on asetettava induktion kautta testeihin. Hänen tunnetuin kaavionsa abduktion loogiselle muodolle on vuodelta 1903: The surprising fact C is observed; But if A were (...) true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to think that A is true. Toisin sanoen abduktio päättelee yllättävästä tosiseikasta hypoteettiseen teoriaan, joka selittäisi tämän faktan. Peircen ajatukset tulivat laajemmin tunnetuiksi, kun kuusiosainen Collected Papers ilmestyi 1931-35. Maailmansodan jälkeen hänen ehdotuksiaan on tulkittu kolmessa suunnassa. Hansonin mukaan abduktio on keksimisen logiikkaa. Laudanin mukaan abduktiossa on kyse ohjeesta työskennellä kiinnostavan hypoteesin parissa. Harmanin mukaan abduktio on päättelyä parhaaseen selitykseen. Monet loogikot, tekoälyn tutkijat ja tieteenfilosofit käyttävät termiä ”abduktio” suoraviivaisesti IBE:n synonyyminä, kun taas varovaisemman kannan ottavat mm. Aliseda, Magnani ja Douven. Toisaalta tätä rinnastusta on eri syistä pidetty harhaanjohtavana abduktion todellisen luonteen ja tehtävän perusteella. Myös monet Peirce-tutkijat ovat ottaneet intohimoisesti kantaa asiaan vedoten mestarin monitulkintaisiin kirjoituksiin. Esimerkiksi Minnamaier esittää, että abduktion samaistaminen IBE:n kanssa hämärtäisi Peircen erottelua induktion ja abduktion välillä. Campos argumentoi, että abduktio tulisi rajata selittävien hypoteesien generoimiseen, joten valikointi hypoteesien välillä ei kuulu sen tehtäviin. Gaultierin mukaan skeeman johtopäätös ei ole suositus testata A:n totuutta, vaan selvittää, onko A todellakin mahdollinen selitys C:lle. Sen sijaan Nyrupin mukaan jättää avoimeksi, tukeeko onnistunut selitys hypoteesin totuutta, joten abduktiossa on kyse hypoteesin työstämisestä. Peircen kirjoituksista puolen vuosisadan aikana kuitenkin löytyy aineksia kaikille kolmelle abduktion päätulkinnalle. Abduktio on ainoa menetelmä uusien ideoiden generoimiseksi. Abduktio auttaa tunnistamaan testaamisen arvioisia hypoteeseja. Joissakin tapauksissa, kuten havainnoissa ja historiallisissa päätelmissä, abduktio on ”pakottavaa” tai ”täysin varmaa”, joten sillä voi olla tekemistä myös hypoteesien oikeuttamisen kanssa. Vaikka Peirce päätyi esittämään, ettei abduktiivisiin päätelmiin liity mitään todennäköisyyksiä, hän kuitenkin myöhäisissäkin töissään antoi abduktiolle selkeän loogisen muodon. Lisäksi abduktion ja IBE:n yhteyttä puolustaa käsikirjoitus ”The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents”, jossa Peirce antaa kriteerejä ”abduktiolle eli hypoteesien valinnan prosessille”. Näitä kriteerejä ovat selitysvoima, testattavuus, varovaisuus, laajuus ja yksinkertaisuus. Samantapaisia metodologisia sääntöjä ovat muotoilleet ne tutkijat, jotka ovat kehitelleet eteenpäin IBE:n muotoja. Vastaus otsikon kysymykseen on siis ”kyllä ja ei”. Vaikka Peirce keksi termin ”abduktio”, hänellä ei ole loputonta yksinoikeutta määrätä sen käytöstä. Hän ajatuksensa ovat inspiroivia tavalla, joka voi johtaa abduktion tutkimisessa erilaisiin suuntiin. Näitä linjoja on tarpeetonta oikeaoppisesti pitää toisilleen vastakkaisina. Keksimisen logiikka on kiehtova aihe, mutta samalla tavoin on aihetta analysoida sitä, miten keksittyjen selityshypoteesien paremmuutta voidaan vertailla ja millaisilla ehdoilla voisimme olla oikeutettuja hyväksymään parhaan toistaiseksi löydetyistä selityksistä. Kaikki nämä loogis-metodologiset tutkimuslinjat tekevät omalla tavallaan oikeutta Peircen filosofian suurille oivalluksille. (shrink)

For as long as realists and instrumentalists have disagreed, partisans of both sides have pointed in argument to the actions and sayings of scientists. Realists in particular have often drawn comfort from theliteralunderstanding given even to very theoretical propositions by many of those who are paid to deploy them. The scientists' realism, according to the realist, is not an idle commitment: a literal understanding of past and present theories and concepts underwrites their employment in the construction ofnewtheories. The theme of (...) this book is philosophy and technology, and here's the connection:newtheories point out—and explain—newphenomena. So realism, claim the realists, is at the heart of science's achievement of what Bacon, that early philosopher of technology, identified as science's aim:newknowledge offeringnewpowers. (shrink)

International Relations's intellectual history is almost always treated as a history of ideas in isolation from both those discursive and political economies which provide its disciplinary and wider context. This paper contributes to this wider analysis by focusing on the impact of the field's discursive economy. Specifically, using Foucaultian archaeologico-genealogical strategy of problematization to analyse the emergence and disciplinary trajectories of Constructivism in IR, this paper argues that Constructivism has been brought gradually closer to its mainstream Neo-utilitarian counterpart through a (...) process of normalization, and investigates how it was possible for Constructivism to be purged of its early critical potential, both theoretical and practical. The first part of the paper shows how the intellectual configuration of Constructivism and its disciplinary fortunes are inseparable from far-from-unproblematic readings of the Philosophy of Social Science: the choices made at this level are neither as intellectually neutral nor as disciplinarily inconsequential as they are presented. The second and third parts chart the genealogies of Constructivism, showing how its overall normalization occurred in two stages, each revolving around particular practices and events. The second part concentrates on older genealogies, analysing the politics of early classificatory practices regarding Constructivism, and showing how these permitted the distillation and immunization of Constructivism – and thus of the rest of the mainstream scholarship which it was depicted as compatible with – against more radical Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques. Finally, the third part focuses attention on recent genealogies, revealing new attempts to reconstruct and reformulate Constructivism: here, indirect neutralization practices such as the elaboration of ‘Pragmatist’ Constructivism, as well as the direct neutralization such as the formulation of ‘Realist’ Constructivism, are key events in Constructivism's normalization. These apparently ‘critical’ alternatives that aim to ‘provide the identity variable’ in fact remain close to Neo-utilitarianism, but their successful representation as ‘critical’ help neutralize calls for greater openness in mainstream IR. Rather than a simple intellectual history, it is this complex process of reading and producing that counts as ‘Constructivism’, which explains both the normalization of Constructivism and the continued marginalization of Postmodernist/Post-structuralist approaches in mainstream IR's infra-disciplinary balance of intellectual power. (shrink)

The question of the dimensionality of space has informed the development of physics since the beginning of the twentieth century in the quest for a unified picture of quantum processes and gravitation. Scientists have worked within various approaches to explain why the universe appears to have a certain number of spatial dimensions. The question of why space has three dimensions has a genuinely philosophical nature that can be shaped as a problem of justifying a contingent necessity of the world. In (...) contrast to explanations of three-dimensionality based on anthropic arguments, we support the search for a theory that provides a justification for the dimensionality of space based on a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning applied to science. In doing so, we argue that Kant correctly approached the question in “Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces” by connecting space dimensionality and the inverse square law. In expounding the strategy of Kant’s argument, we describe the main features of a general Kantian explanation of the dimensionality of space and discuss them with respect to current accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science, such as inference to the best explanation and the deductive-nomological model. (shrink)

According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...) focus on Goldman’s latter claim. After updating Goldman’s account of how ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons in the light of Goldman’s newest formulation of his simulation theory of mental ascription (Goldman, Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), I develop and assess Goldman’s arguments in favour of the reliability of simulation for interpersonal comparisons. I argue that, under certain conditions, there may be room for a scientifically acceptable solution to the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. (shrink)

These preprints were automatically compiled into a PDF from the collection of papers deposited in PhilSci-Archive in conjunction with the PSA 2012.

An effect is typically explained by citing a cause, but not any cause will do. The oxygen and the spark were both causes of the fire, but normally only the spark explains it. What then distinguishes explanatory from unexplanatory causes? One might attempt to characterise this distinction in terms of intrinsic features of the causes. For example, some causes are changes while others are standing conditions, and one might claim that only the changes explain. Both the spark and the oxygen (...) are causes of the fire, but only the spark is a change, and perhaps this is the reason only the spark explains. On the other hand, one might attempt to characterise the distinction between explanatory and unexplanatory causes in terms of the relation between cause and effect. For example, only some causes are sufficient for their effects, and perhaps only sufficient causes explain. There is, however, an elementary feature of the distinction between explanatory and unexplanatory causes that neither an intrinsic nor a relational approach are well-suited to capture. This is the so-called `interest-relativity' of explanation: the very same cause may be explanatory for one person but not for another. When there is a famine in India, an Indian peasant may explain this by citing the drought, while a member of the World Health Organization may instead cite the failure of the Indian government to stock adequate reserves of food (Hart and Honore, 1985, pp. (shrink)

In vitro experimental approaches are of central importance to contemporary molecular and cellular biology and toxicology. However, the scientific value or impact of in vitro results depends on their relevance in vivo. In vitro effect studies address inobservable in vivo phenomena through experiments on analogous in vitro phenomena. We present a theoretical basis developed to evaluate the in vivo relevance of in vitro effect studies. As a case study, the procedure for measuring specific gene transcription in isolated cell nuclei (nuclear (...) run-off method) is analyzed It is concluded that current evidence fails to justify in vivo interpretations of nuclear run-off experiments within the framework of theoretical models of transcription, implying that quantitative in vivo interpretations are unwarranted. Qualitative interpretations of nuclear run-off experiments may be justified by inferring the best explanation, especially when significant in vitro effects follow in vivo perturbations.Elements of a general theory are proposed. It is concluded that quantitative in vivo interpretations are warranted primarily in biochemical quantitation of biomolecules, while studies on biological function should be interpreted qualitatively in terms of causal explanations. Inferences to the best explanations are strengthened through additional evidence and the creation of experimental differences (effects). (shrink)

Among theory theorists, it is commonly thought that folk psychological theory is tacitly known. However, folk psychological knowledge has none of the central features of tacit knowledge. But if it is ordinary knowledge, why is it that we have difficulties expressing anything but a handful of folk psychological generalisations? The reason is that our knowledge is of theoretical models and hypotheses, not of universal generalisations. Adopting this alternative view of (scientific) theories, we come to see that, given time and reflection, (...) we can say what we know. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to increase our ontological understanding of musical works in two ways. We’ll increase our understanding of their categorial nature and we’ll increase our understanding of what the identity of each musical work consists in. In chapter 1, I introduce the basic question of the thesis: what are musical works? This question is broken down into four separate questions which guide the structure and argument of the thesis. One question asks if musical works exist, the (...) other asks about the ontological category to which musical works belong. In the first half of the thesis, I argue that musical works exist and that the best explanation of their features is given by assigning them to the category of universals. I argue for this conclusion by elaborating and defending a view according to which musical works are properties. I then show that this conception is superior to the strongest rivals. One rival takes musical works to be historical individuals (Rohrbaugh 2003). The other takes them to be actions of composition (Davies 2004). In chapter 6, I turn to two questions about identity. One question asks about the identity criteria for musical works, the other question asks for an explanation of musical work identity. In the remainder of chapter 6, I argue by reference to contextualist intuitions that a superficially appealing view, sonicism is problematic. The critique of sonicism is used to draw out certain contextualist assumptions that our ontology of music ought to explain. In chapter 7, I examine a family of Levinsonian contextualist proposals. I argue that the original formulations (Levinson 1980) give incorrect results, and that attempts to modify them (Davies, S: 2001) slip into obscurity, or undermine the aims of the project (Levinson 1992). I end chapter 7 by presenting the performance theory in a more flattering light. I argue that as a theory of musical work identity, the performance theory is the best on the market because it overcomes the problems associated with the Levinsonian views and deepens our understanding of contextualist intuitions. In chapter 8, I present an account of the ontology of music which integrates the property theory of category with the performance theory of identity by construing musical works as impure relational properties. I then defend the integrated account against various objections. In this defence, I elaborate a view of compositional actions as belonging to the ontological category of processes. (shrink)

Any theoretician constructing a serious model of consciousness should carefully assess the details of empirical data generated in the neurosciences and psychology. A failure to account for those details may cast doubt on the adequacy of that model. This paper presents a case in point. Dennett and Kinsbourne's (Dennett, D., & Kinsbourne, M. (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 183-243) assault on the materialist version of the Cartesian (...) Theater model of the mind relies significantly on the superiority of their Multiple Drafts model of consciousness as an explanation of the phenomenon of metacontrast. However, their description of metacontrast is, in important ways, inadequate. The result is that their explanation of how the Multiple Drafts model handles this phenomenon fails to account for the actual data. In this paper I offer a more complete description of metacontrast, show how Dennett and Kinsbourne's explanation fails, and argue that there are good theoretical reasons for choosing the so-called Stalinesque model over the so-called Orwellian model. (shrink)

An emphasis on explanatory contribution is central to a recent formulation of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism. Because scientific realism is argued for by means of inference to the best explanation, it has been further argued that being a scientific realist entails a commitment to IA and thus to mathematical realism. It has, however, gone largely unnoticed that the way that IBE is argued to be truth conducive involves citing successful applications of IBE and tracing this success over time. (...) This in turn involves identifying those constituents of scientific theories that are responsible for their predictive success and showing that these constituents are retained across theory change in science. I argue that even if mathematics can be shown to feature in best explanations, the role of mathematics in scientific theories does not satisfy the condition that mathematics is always retained across theory change. According to a scientific realist, this condition needs to be met for making ontological claims on the basis of explanatory contribution. Thus scientific realists are not committed to mathematical realism on the basis of this recent formulation of IA. (shrink)

Herein is provided a brief overview of agent-based modeling , with a particular slant toward its potential as a tool for the theoretical biologist. Of course, its use for experimentalists is obvious; they are, as a group, already using agent-based models to examine contemporary biological questions ranging from molecular processes to evolving ecological landscapes . For the modeler-theoretician, ABMs offer a new tool for thinking about the structure of biological processes, thus creating a conduit for integrative perspective taking between the (...) experimentalist and the theoretician. (shrink)

Clinical diagnostic medicine is an experimental science based on observation, hypothesis making, and testing. It is an use dynamic process that involves observation and summary, diagnostic conjectures, testing, review, observation and summary, new or revised conjectures, i.e. it is an iterative process. It can then be said that diagnostic hypotheses are also ‘observation-laden’. My aim is to enlarge on the strategies of medical diagnosis as these are meshed in training and clinical experience—that is, to describe the patterns of reasoning used (...) by experienced clinicians under different diagnostic circumstances and how these patterns of inquiry allow further insight into the evaluation and treatment of patients. I do not aim to present a theory and illustrate it with examples; I wish rather am to let a realistic example, similar to actual clinical scenarios, direct the exposition. To this end, I introduce an account of medical diagnosis—briefly comparing and contrasting it to other accounts—in order to focus on discussing the process of diagnosis through a detailed clinical case. (shrink)

Psychoneural reduction has been debated extensively in the philosophy of neuroscience. In this article I will evaluate metascientific approaches that claim direct molecular and cellular explanations of cognitive functions. I will initially consider the issues involved in linking cellular properties to behaviour from the general perspective of neural circuits. These circuits that integrate the molecular and cellular components underlying cognition and behaviour, making consideration of circuit properties relevant to reductionist debates. I will then apply this general perspective to specific systems (...) where psychoneural reduction has been claimed, namely hippocampal long-term potentiation and the Aplysia gill-withdrawal reflex. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman cast the ‘problem of induction’ as the task of articulating the principles and standards by which to distinguish valid from invalid inductive inferences. This paper explores some logical bounds on the ability of a rational reasoner to accomplish this task. By a simple argument, either an inductive inference method cannot admit its own fallibility, or there exists some non-inferable hypothesis whose non-inferability the method cannot infer (violating the principle of ‘negative introspection’). The paper discusses some implications of this (...) limited self-knowledge for the justifiability of inductive inferences, auto-epistemic logic, and the epistemic foundations of game theory. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problems of justifying and explaining beliefs about facts in the context of civil trials. The first section contains some remarks about the nature of adjudicative fact-finding and highlights the communicative features of deciding about facts in judicial context. In Sect. 2, some difficulties and the incompleteness presented by Bayesian and coherentist frameworks, which are taken as methods suitable to solve the above-mentioned problems, are pointed out. In the third section, the purely epistemic approach to the justification (...) and the explanation of beliefs about facts is abandoned and focus is given to the dialectical nature of civil procedure, where the parties and, particularly, the judge have to make their reasoning clear enough to allow a fruitful and efficient debate about facts. For this purpose, a communication/argumentation system is put forward, consisting of fourteen intertwined rules of discourse. The system embodies the fundamental epistemic principle according to which belief is updated given new evidence, is tailored for abductive inferences and is structured on fundamental concepts of civil procedural law. The fourth section presents an empirical application of the system to a real case. (shrink)

According to the demand of the Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) method, a theory is confirmed when the prediction-observation (p-o) gap is small and disconfirmed when the gap is large. A major goal of this paper is to introduce a research domain for which this demand does not hold. In contrast to the H-D method's demand, this research, called the Catch model for reconstructing a face previously seen from memory, requires an increase, within limits, in the p-o gap. The Catch model research substantiates (...) theoretically and empirically a new proposed method that I call the "Deductive-Reconstruction" (D-R) method. This method provides essential conditions whose fulfillment guarantees successful reconstruction of past events (a face previously seen) from memory. It is argued that the D-R method fits the area of research of reconstructing past events from memory better than the H-D method. Application of the H-D method to the Catch model's research domain leads to an internal contradiction and failure to reconstruct past events (a face previously seen) from memory. Finally, the nature of the D-R method along with the Catch model is discussed from three points of view: confirmation, explanation, and generality. (shrink)