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  1. Introduction: Contested narratives of the mind and the brain: Neuro/psychological knowledge in popular debates and everyday life.Susanne Schregel - 2020 - History of the Human Sciences 33 (5):12–36.
    This article explores the history of British Mensa to examine the contested status of high intelligence in Great Britain between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. Based on journals and leaflets from the association and newspaper articles about it, the article shows how protagonists from the high IQ society campaigned for intelligence and its testing among the British public. Yet scathing reactions to the group in newspapers suggest that journalists considered it socially provocative to stress one’s own brainpower as (...)
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  • Attachment and the archive: barriers and facilitators to the use of historical sociology as complementary developmental science.Robbie Duschinsky - 2019 - Science in Context 32 (3):309-326.
    ArgumentThis article explores historical sociology as a complementary source of knowledge for scientific research, considering barriers and facilitators to this work through reflections on one project. This project began as a study of the emergence and reception of the infant disorganized attachment classification, introduced in the 1980s by Ainsworth’s student Mary Main, working with Judith Solomon. Elsewhere I have reported on the findings of collaborative work with attachment researchers, without giving full details of how this came about. Here, I will (...)
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  • On IQ and other sciencey descriptions of minds.Devin Sanchez Curry - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Philosophers of mind (from eliminative materialists to psychofunctionalists to interpretivists) generally assume that a normative ideal delimits which mental phenomena exist (though they disagree about how to characterize the ideal in question). This assumption is dubious. A comprehensive ontology of mind includes some mental phenomena that are neither (a) explanatorily fecund posits in any branch of cognitive science that aims to unveil the mechanistic structure of cognitive systems nor (b) ideal (nor even progressively closer to ideal) posits in any given (...)
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