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What causes effects?

Philosophical Studies 39 (2):107 - 139 (1981)

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  1. Anaphoric reference to facts, propositions, and events.Philip L. Peterson - 1982 - Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (2):235 - 276.
    Factive predicates (like ‘-matters’, ‘discover-’, ‘realizes-’) take NPs that refer to facts, propositional predicates (like ‘-seems’, ‘believes-’, ‘-likely’) take NPs that refer to propositions, and eventive predicates (like ‘-occurs’, ‘-take place’, ‘-causes-’) take NPs that refer to events (broadly speaking, including states, processes, conditions, ect.). Logically speaking at least two out of the three categories (facts, propositions, and events) can be eliminated. So, if all three kinds of referents turn out to be required for natural language semantics, their postulation is (...)
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  • Semantic emphasis in causal sentences.Cindy D. Stern - 1993 - Synthese 95 (3):379 - 418.
    A shift in emphasis can change the truth-value of a singular causal sentence. This poses a challenge to the view that singular sentences predicate a relation. I argue that emphasized causal sentences conjoin predication of a causal relation between events with predication of a relation of causal relevance between states of affairs (or perhaps facts). This is superior to the treatments of such sentences offered by Achinstein, Dretske, Kim, Sanford, Bennett, and Levin. My proposal affords clarity regarding logical structure, at (...)
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  • Which universals are laws?Philip L. Peterson - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):492 – 496.
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  • (1 other version)Which Universal?Philip L. Peterson - 1988 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1):24-30.
    D.A. Armstrong’s account (1983, intimately influenced by Tooley 1977 and Swoyer 1982) of natural laws is that they arerelations between universals.Armstrong doesn’t simply hold that laws are some relationships or other between universals. He also holds that they are first-order universals themselves (1983, pp. 89-90). Each ordinary law-say,causallaw-is numerically identical to some first-order universal. This is a striking, seemingly incredible hypothesis. What is Armstrong thinking of when he says (1983, p. 90):I propose that the state of affairs, the law, N(F,G), (...)
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