To show favouritism toward humans has been considered a prejudice, otherwise known as 'human chauvinism', 'anthropocentrism' or 'speciesism'. Peter Singer is one philosopher in particular who holds this view. In this paper I argue that there is a lack of coherence between his ethical ideology and his actual ethical theory. Singer's ethics in crucial respects exhibits favouritism toward humans, which is something he fails to justify non-partially and plausibly. It would thus be an instance of speciesism, in a sense of (...) this term that he probably would accept. This, however, does not mean that his ethics should be rejected or is impossible to defend. (shrink)

Elizabeth Hamilton (1758–1816) has not so far been considered a philosopher, probably because she wrote novels and tracts on education rather than philosophical treatises. This paper argues that Hamilton’s novel Memoirs of Modern Philosophers (1800) should be read as a philosophical text, both for its close engagement with William Godwin’s moral theory and for what it suggests about Hamilton’s own moral theory and moral psychology. Studies of Memoirs have so far either characterized it as merely satire of Godwin, or, if (...) they have read it as containing arguments against Godwin’s views, have described those arguments in very broad strokes, without looking closely at the text to see if the descriptions are warranted. A careful examination of Memoirs shows that Hamilton objected primarily to one key aspect of Godwin’s moral theory, namely, his insistence that actions affecting others must be based on an impartial, disinterested assessment of a person’s contribution to general utility rather than on their particular relationship to the agent. Memoirs also points towards Hamilton’s own moral theory, as exemplified in her Series of Popular Essays (1813), with its emphasis on ‘benevolent affections’ that are directed towards family members and people in the agent’s social circle. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: To determine the relationship between ethical reasoning and gender and occupation among a group of male and female nurses and doctors. DESIGN: Partialist and impartialist forms of ethical reasoning were defined and singled out as being central to the difference between what is known as the "care" moral orientation (Gilligan) and the "justice" orientation (Kohlberg). A structured questionnaire based on four hypothetical moral dilemmas involving combinations of (health care) professional, non-professional, life-threatening and non-life-threatening situations, was piloted and then mailed (...) to a randomly selected sample of doctors and nurses. SETTING: 400 doctors from Victoria, and 200 doctors and 400 nurses from New South Wales. RESULTS: 178 doctors and 122 nurses returned completed questionnaires. 115 doctors were male, 61 female; 50 nurses were male and 72 were female. It was hypothesised that there would be an association between feminine subjects and partialist reasoning and masculine subjects and impartialist reasoning. It was also hypothesised that nurses would adopt a partialist approach to reasoning and doctors an impartialist approach. No relationship between any of these variables was observed. (shrink)

Should a patient in a persistent vegetative state live? Is the life of a patient in a mere biological state worthwhile maintaining? I would argue that the life of a PVS patient is instrumentally valuable in so far as it can satisfy the family’s preference to keep it alive. A PVS patient should live if the patient’s family desires it Conversely, the PVS patient should be allowed to die or be actively killed if no one desires him or her to (...) live. Mere biological life has no value at all when no one finds it valuable and it is morally permissible to destroy something valueless to everyone.Under what circumstances should the desires of a PVS patient’s family be disregarded? Their desire to keep the patient alive should not be unlimited if that would evidently harm other patients. The objection based on just resource allocation could set the limits of a family’s desire to keep the patient in a certain condition. I would argue that when only one bed is available in intensive care unit, the life and interests of conscious patient should override these of PVS patients and preferences of the family to keep the PVS patient alive. This is because harm that the conscious patient suffers is much more serious than that suffered by the family.Whether to use organs of PVS patients is also discussed. Is the family’s donating the patients’ organs a minimum duty of no harm or an act of beneficence? It is uncertain. It might be a supererogatory action for the family to do so in a certain situation. (shrink)