This article deals with the question of the reception and “history of effects” of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. More precisely, in the present contribution I take into examination some original and influential “appropriations” of Kant’s third Critique in the context of 20 th -century and contemporary hermeneutics, providing both a reconstruction and a critical interpretation of the readings of Kant’s work provided by Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and nowadays Günter Figal. In the first section I basically offer (...) an overview of Kant’s conception of the power of judgment as an introduction to the topics investigated into detail in the following sections of this article. Then, I focus on the different interpretations of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment offered by the abovementioned hermeneutical philosophers, showing that, in a quite surprising and theoretically stimulating way, in the development of a phenomenological-hermeneutical aesthetics and/or philosophy of art from Heidegger to Gadamer up to Figal, we can observe a progressive shift from a sort of “disinterest” in Kant’s conception of aesthetics in favour of Hegel’s philosophy of art, to an explicit critique of the supposed subjectivization of aesthetics by Kant and its problematic consequences, up to a full-blown rehabilitation and retrieval of the significance of Kant’s treatment of beauty in the third Critique as still essential for any serious philosophical aesthetics. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to analyse the way in which Heidegger’s work Being and Time is based on the relationship between four concepts with methodological function: phenomenon, logos, interpretation , and truth. This relationship describes the methodological code of the Heideggerian analysis: the definition of the phenomenality, the identification of the only possible phenomenon that satisfy the phenomenological definition and the drafting of the way of access to being. Truth as disclosedness belongs to the constitution of being (...) of Dasein and it is not primordially a determination of the statements. Dasein is at the same time “in untruth” because the falling prey belongs equiprimordially to its constitution. In the last part of the paper we identify the main changes of the concept of truth and of the meaning of phenomenality after the Heideggerian Kehre. (shrink)